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Corporate Auctions and · Directors' Fiduciary Duties: 
A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule 
Delaware courts have toughened the standard of review under the 
business judgment rule for upholding takeover defensive measures ap-
proved by target boards of directors. 1 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 2 the Delaware Supreme Court created a two-prong test that 
put the burden on target directors to show (1) that they have reason to 
believe a takeover bid poses a threat to the corporate enterprise, and 
(2) that their defensive actions are reasonable in relation to the threat.3 
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings 4 the court tightened 
the second prong of the Unocal test by adding the requirement that 
any defensive measures be rationally related to shareholder benefit. 5 
Further, the Revlon court held that when sale or break up of a target 
corporation becomes "inevitable," the directors must act as auction-
eers whose primary responsibility is to realize the best sale price for 
the benefit of stockholders. 6 The directors must deal fairly and equally 
with competing bidders and must not close off active bidding without 
significant gain for shareholders. 7 
The Unocal two-prong test for business judgment rule protection 
has limited relevance in the auction phase8 of a takeover contest. The 
1. See Brennan, New Cases on the Business Judgment Rule: Defending Defensive Tactics Be-
comes More Difficult, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 245 (1986); Wander & LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: 
Corporate Control Transactions and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29 (1986); 
Gerlits & Barnard, Poison Pill Takeover Defense Lays Open Corporate Boards, Natl. L.J., May 27, 
1985, at 15, col. 1. A basic definition of "takeover" is contained in 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEIN· 
BERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.01[1] (1987): 
A takeover is an attempt by a bidder ("raider'') to acquire control of a subject company 
("target") through acquisition of some or all of its outstanding shares. Most commonly, 
takeover bids are made directly to shareholders of the target as a cash tender offer or as an 
exchange offer of raider securities for target stock. 
The principal takeover approaches include a "friendly" transaction negotiated with 
management; a "bear hug," in which the raider notifies the target of a proposed acquisition 
transaction; a "hostile" offer made directly to target shareholders, without management ap-
proval; and, as a supplement or alternative to these approaches, large open market and/or 
privately negotiated purchases of target stock. 
2. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
3. 493 A.2d at· 955. 
4. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
5. 506 A.2d at 182; see Greene & Palmiter, Business Judgment Rule Tightened for Takeovers, 
Legal Times, Jan. 20, 1986, at S3, col. 1. The Unocal·Revlon formulation has been termed the 
"second generation" of the business judgment rule. See Mirvis, Corporate Takeovers and the 
Business Judgment Rule: The Second Generation, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 37, col. 1. 
6. 506 A.2d at 182. 
7. See 506 A.2d at 184. 
8. This Note uses the term "auction phase" to refer to that phase of a takeover battle in 
which sale of the target is "inevitable" and the company's directors are charged with the respon-
sibilities of auctioneers. The term "response phase" will refer to the initial stages of a takeover 
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Unocal test balances defensive actions against perceived threats to the 
corporation, but any question of a threat to the enterprise is "moot" 
during a Revlon auction. 9 After commencement of a corporate auc-
tion, the director-auctioneers may no longer defend the company 
against threats to the corporate enterprise.10 Revlon does not explic-
itly formulate a new business judgment rule test for reviewing the ac-
tions of a target board once a corporate auction has begun.11 It does 
attempt which occur prior to the auction phase. Of course, many takeover attempts are blocked 
or aborted before reaching an auction phase. 
While the response phase of a transaction may not prove difficult to identify, determining 
when an auction phase commences is not a settled question. Uncertainty has resulted because 
the cases that discuss the auction phase contain fact situations where it is obvious that a company 
will or will not "inevitably" be sold. In Revlon, for example, the court determined that pressure 
from one potential acquirer, Pantry Pride, had made the sale ofRevicin inevitable, and Revlon's 
directors had assumed the duties of auctioneers when they recrignized this inevitability by au-
thorizing management to negotiate a sale to a third party. Revlon, S06 A.2d at 182. The court 
supported this finding of inevitability with evidence of the board's willingness to break up Revlon 
(by authorizing management to negotiate a sale to a third party) and grant lock-up options on its 
various divisions. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79, 182. The existence of a competitive auction 
was further shown by the presence of two competing bidders. Because this evidence pointed 
conclusively toward the finding of a competitive auction, however, the Revlon rationale fails to 
help future courts identify the beginning of an auction phase in ambiguous cases. 
In many situations, the authorization to negotiate a sale to a third party may not signify a 
corporate auction but rather a preliminary step toward serious negotiation. Such a subsequent 
sale could be contingent on receiving a satisfactory and well-financed offer. In Delaware, corpo-
rate boards are allowed to explore the possibility of a merger or acquisition without being irrevo-
cably drawn toward that course of action. In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), for example, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to impose auctioneer-
ing duties on directors where the target was stalked by a single hostile bidder. The court refused 
application of the Revlon analysis even though the Newmont board's solicitous dealings with a 
third party (Newmont's largest shareholder) kept the company independent by the slimmest 
fractional percentage. See note 75 infra. The court accepted the directors' arguments that their 
response to the coercive offer had actually preserved Newmont's independence, that they did not 
plan to sell the company, and that the third party was not a competing bidder but merely a 
shareholder out to protect its significant stake in the target. "Revlon applies here," the court 
stated, "only if it was apparent that the sale of Newmont was 'inevitable'." 535 A.2d at 1345. 
Since Newmont was never for sale, the auctioneering duties of Revlon never applied. 
In contrast to Newmont Mining, the Sixth Circuit in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 
882 (6th Cir. 1986), identified the commencement of an auction in the mere fact that the raider, 
Asher Edelman, had announced an intention to make an all-cash tender offer for all Fruehauf 
shares at a price likely to elicit tender from the company's shareholders. The important point to 
the court was that the target board "realized that a change of ownership of Fruehauf was immi-
nent and that the company would end up being sold." 798 F.2d at 884. Fruehauf management 
acted on this realization by arranging its own leveraged buyout proposal. 798 F.2d at 884. Froe-
hauf also provides little substantive guidance since the question of whether Edelman's attempted 
takeover of Fruehauf had entered the auction phase was not an issue before the court. See 798 
F.2d at 886 ("All sides agree that Fruehauf is on the auction block."). 
Some recent takeover battles have involved disputes over whether the auction phase has com-
menced, especially when the battle involves two or more potential suitors. See, e.g., Black & 
Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988); CRTF Corp. v. 
Federated Dept. Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). At the same time, the question of 
when an auctioneer's duty arises has begun to attract some commentary. See, e.g., Bogen & 
Duke, The Auctioneer's Duty: Unraveling Revlon, INSIGHTS, July 1988. at 3, 6. 
9. 506 A.2d at 182. 
10. 506 A.2d at 182. 
11. The Revlon court applied the Unocal test, although no business judgment rule test was 
really required in reviewing the Revlon directors' conduct of the corporate auction given the 
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not provide guidance in cases where sale of the target is inevitable but 
a lively auction has not yet developed. In these cases the target board 
may attempt to obstruct a tender offer for the purpose of attracting 
other bidders and stimulating a competitive bidding contest. 12 Com-
mencement of an auction phase in a control contest might trigger a 
judicial review into the substantive fairness of such actions. 13 This re-
view could be similar to the duty of loyalty analysis employed by 
courts in cases where there is evidence of director conflict of interest. 14 
A recent opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner highlights the 
need for a standard of review of auction-phase control transactions 
that is coherent with the Unocal-Revlon elaboration of the business 
judgment rule. In Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (CTS 
II), 15 the Seventh Circuit relied on the Revlon decision to challenge a 
poison pill rights plan adopted after the CTS board had voted to sell 
the company, even though the district court had found the plan rea-
sonably designed to stimulate further bidding. In reviewing the 
board's actions under the second prong of the Unocal test, the court 
demanded extensive proof that the terms of the rights plan were sup-
ported by sound :financial analysis, and reserved judgment on whether 
a board is ever justified in taking defensive measures after it has com-
strong evidence of disloyalty. See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUl-
smONS 112 (Supp. 1987) ("the court found that the Revlon directors violated their duty of 
loyalty in agreeing to the lock-up, thereby rendering the new [Unocal] two-step review irrele-
vant"); see also notes 101-03 infra and accompanying text. 
12. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dynam-
ics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ill.), supplemented on rehg., 
638 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd. in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 
1986); see also note 8 supra. 
13. Cf. Block & Barton, Burden Shifted: Boards' Role in 'Hanson' and 'Revlon~ Natl. L.J., 
Apr. 21, 1986, at 19, col. 4, at 26, col. 2: 
The unifying theme of these cases is that, when directors usurp the stockholders' right to 
control the corporation's destiny, the burden of proof is on the directors to prove the fair-
ness of their actions - i.e., that the stockholders have achieved a real benefit. Once a sale of 
the company is ordained, the best interests of the stockholders normally are served by al-
lowing market forces to operate freely. In such circumstances, a defensive tactic that artifi-
cially terminates a competitive auction for corporate control will be difficult to justify. 
It has been argued that Revlon "narrowed" a board's ability to meet the Unocal good-faith 
standard by precluding any actions that foreclose bidding during an auction and that this re-
quired good-faith showing is necessary to overcome a "presumption" of self-dealing by the direc-
tors. See Comment, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at 
Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 556-59 (1987). 
14. For examples of the duty of loyalty analysis in the context of a takeover defense, see 
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM AcquL;tion, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 278 (2d Cir. 1986) ("When 
engaging in defensive maneuvers, such as a lock-up option, a director's primary obligation is to 
ensure the overall fairness, including a fair option price, to the shareholders."); Norlin Corp. v. 
Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (directors' locking up voting control in 
their own hands constituted self-interest sufficient to require a demonstration that their actions 
were fair and reasonable); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 
114-15 (Del. Ch. 1986) (coercive self-tender violates the second prong of the Unocal test and 
"can only be sustained if it is objectively or intrinsically fair''); see also Part II infra. 
15. 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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mitted itself to a sale of the corporation.16 The scrutiny contemplated 
in CTS II bears close resemblance to the duty of loyalty analysis, 17 
and may herald an abandonment of the business judgment rule in the 
context of a corporate auction. However, a standard of review that 
allows judicial examination into the financial analysis behind an auc-
tion-phase decision may hamstring a board's ability to generate a com-
petitive auction that could maximize shareholder wealth. 18 Such a 
result would be inconsistent with Delaware case law. While imposing 
strict limitations on the conduct of target directors in corporate auc-
tions, the Delaware Supreme Court continues to maintain a strong 
preference for fostering the active exercise of business judgment.19 
This Note proposes a rationale and a methodology for applying the 
business judgment rule when directors resist a hostile bid during the 
auction phase of a control contest. Part I examines the changes that 
occur in the responsibilities of target directors when a corporate auc-
tion is initiated. This Part describes the Unocal business judgment 
rule test and discusses its usefulness in the auction phase of a takeover. 
While the test requires modification if it is to complement effectively 
the auction-phase duties announced in Revlon, this Part suggests that 
the business judgment rule continues to be relevant and important 
during a corporate auction. Finally, this Part discusses target resist-
ance in the auction phase, and closely examines the standard of review 
employed in CTS II to determine whether this case represents an un-
16. 805 F.2d at 717. 
17. For a discussion of the duty of loyalty analysis, see Part II infra. 
18. Cf. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 
(1982) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Tender Offers]. Bebchuk advocates a federal "rule of auctioneer-
ing" to displace the existing common law of corporate fiduciary duties. His rule of auctioneering 
would impose a time delay in tender offers allowing target management an opportunity to com-
municate information about the target firm for the purpose of soliciting competing bids. 
Bebchuk argues that such regulation would benefit target shareholders by maximizing premiums 
in all acquisitions - whether negotiated or hostile. He would assign to target management the 
role of auctioneer since management can best provide the information prospective acquirers must 
have in deciding whether and at what price to bid. Concomitantly, he advocates a complete ban 
on defensive tactics that inhibit tender offers. He argues that target managers cannot be trusted 
to acquiesce in a sale of the company or to deal impartially between favored and disfavored 
bidders. For Bebchuk, allowing management to obstruct unsolicited takeover bids made directly 
to shareholders inevitably translates into a loss in premium and diminished shareholder welfare. 
This Note similarly advocates the facilitation of corporate auctions and, like Bebchuk's the-
sis, focuses on the role target directors may play in soliciting competitive bids. However, this 
Note does not address hypothetical federal regulation. Rather, the Note is confined to an exami-
nation of current Delaware law and the possibility of effectuating auctions by refining the chief 
judicial tool for reviewing director conduct, the business judgment rule. . 
19. This preference for an active target board is evident in Delaware court opinions respect-
ing every phase of takeovers. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 
(Del. 1987) (defensive "street sweep" and standstill agreement upheld); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 n.16 (Del. 1986) (during a corporate auction, "[t)he 
directors' role remains an active one"); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 
1985) (prospective adoption of rights plan protected by the business judgment rule); Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (discriminatory self-tender offer done in 
response to a hostile takeover attempt upheld under the business judgment rule). 
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due departure from the use of the business judgment rule developed in 
Unocal and Revlon. Part II defines those situations in which the duty 
of loyalty analysis should supersede the business judgment rule. This 
Part distinguishes suspected conflicts of interest from manifest con-
flicts of interest, and argues that business judgment rule protection 
should be available in cases involving no more than a suspected con-
flict of interest. Finally, Part III formulates a standard of review for 
applying the business judgment rule in the auction phase. This Part 
suggests that the reasonableness of target resistance be measured using 
Delaware's policy of facilitating corporate auctions for the maximiza-
tion of shareholder gain. 
I. CORPORATE AUCTIONS AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The business judgment rule is a judicial standard for the review of 
corporate decisionmaking. The traditional rule protects from liability 
disinterested directors who have, in the exercise of their business judg-
ment, satisfied the standards of conduct required by state Iaw.20 These 
standards of conduct derive from the duties of care and loyalty that 
directors, as fiduciaries, owe the corporation and its shareholders.21 
As long as a board has acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and 
in the honest belief that its actions are in the best interests of the com-
pany, courts will refrain from further scrutiny of a business decision.22 
20. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); see also 
D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OP 
CoRPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 9-17 (1987) [hereinafter THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE]. In their comprehensive and up-to-date treatise on the business judgment rule, Block, 
Barton, and Radin describe the rule as requiring the presence of five factors: a business decision, 
disinterestedness, due care, good faith, and no abuse of discretion. Id. at 9; see also 3A W. 
Fl.ETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS § 1040, at 58 (1986). The 
presence of a business decision is a prerequisite since business judgment rule protection is not 
available where directors have failed to act. The rule requires an affirmative business decision, 
which may include a conscious decision not to act. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 
(Del. 1984). The "no abuse of discretion" element in this description of the business judgment 
rule refers primarily to court decisions concerning the wasting of corporate assets or other ac-
tions that have no rational business purpose. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra, at 15-
18. 
21. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, at 23. Under the duty of care, corpo-
rate directors must perform their responsibilities with the care of an ordinarily prudent person 
under similar circumstances. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 
1984); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1984). For purposes of the business 
judgment rule, due care means that directors have informed themselves "prior to making a busi-
ness decision, of all material information reasonably available to them." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Similarly, the duty ofloyalty demands that when making decisions 
affecting the company, directors place allegiance to the enterprise above their own self-interests. 
See Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1599 (1978) (directors "should not use ••• 
corporate position to make a personal profit or gain other personal advantage"). 
22. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 624 (1984); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard - Safe Harbor or 
Uncharted Reef?, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980); Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard -Same Harbor 
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The traditional business judgment rule creates a presumption that dis-
interested directors have met all required standards of conduct. 23 
Behind the rule stands a judicial policy of practical deference. 
Courts hesitate to interfere with business operations and will not sub-
stitute their inexpert judgment for the judgment of a board of directors 
whose decisions are attributable to "any rational business purpose."24 
The principal concern is that corporate directors be given sufficient 
discretion to develop business strategies that may enhance the com-
pany's effectiveness and profitability in response to complex and rap-
idly changing market forces.25 Imposing judicial process into business 
decisionmaking may undermine director discretion, thereby discour-
aging directors from pursuing desirable business risks.26 Judicial over-
sight may also impede the free play of market forces, which demand 
efficiency in corporate management and by themselves operate as a 
check on board power.21 
The traditional version of the business judgment rule covers opera-
tional decisions made by directors in the day-to-day conduct of the 
corporation's affairs, including, for example, decisions to purchase 
new capital assets or expand production capacity.28 The approval by a 
target board of a defensive measure affecting corporate control differs 
from a normal operational business decision because of the strong pos-
sibility· that target directors have acted in their own self-interest to 
But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980). Cf. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CoRP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984): 
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a 
committee: 
(1) in good faith; 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and 
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
Twenty-two states have enacted statutory standards of conduct that track Model Act § 8.30(a). 
See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, app. c, at 361. The Delaware standards 
have been articulated by the courts and have not been codified. 
23. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 
F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); R. BALOTTI & J. FINKELSI'EIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CoRPO-
RATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.6, at 74 (1986). A plaintiff seeking to hold direc-
tors liable for harm resulting from their decisions has the burden of rebutting these 
presumptions. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
24. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
25. See Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 621, 650-51 (1983); see also Comment, The Presumptions and Burdens of the Duty of Loy-
alty Regarding Target Company Defensive Tactics, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 273, 274 (1987). The board 
of directors is statutorily assigned responsibility over the corporate helm. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1983); CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 300(a) (West 1977); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CoRP. ACT § 8.0l(b) (1984). 
26. See Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests for Corpo-
rate Control, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 980, 983-84 (1982). 
27. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Managemeni in Responding to a 
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1196 (1981). 
28. Wander & LeCoque, supra note 1, at 42. 
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retain control.29 Nevertheless, Delaware courts apply the business 
judgment rule to shield the decisions of target directors who resist a 
takeover in situations where the directors can show that they have 
satisfied their duties of care and loyalty to the corporate enterprise and 
can show that any defensive. measures adopted are reasonable and ra-
tionally related to shareholder benefit. 30 
A. Director Conduct and the Unocal Test 
The principal case governing the fiduciary duties of target directors 
and the applicability of the business judgment rule to takeover de-
fenses is Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 31 In Unocal, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court reaffirmed use of the business judgment rule in 
29. See Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Take-
over Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44, 49 (1983). 
30. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, S06 A.2d 173, 179-82 (Del. 1986); see 
also Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., SOO A.2d 1346, 13SO (Del. 198S); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 198S). 
Before 198S, courts generally applied the favorable presumptions of the traditional business 
judgment rule to protect from injunction defensive control transactions. Courts held that the 
business judgment rule was appropriate provided the target directors who approved such trans-
actions were not acting for the primary purpose of entrenching themselves in office. See Panter 
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 4S4 U.S. 1092 (1981); Tread-
way Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 3S7, 383 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 
292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 4SO U.S. 999 (1981); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 
(Del. 1984); see also Block & Miller, supra note 29, at 47-S2. The burden of showing improper 
motive lay with the plaintiffs. Where a primary purpose of entrenchment was shown, the burden 
would shift to the directors to show that the transaction was, in fact, fair to the corporation. See 
S. LoRNE, ACQUISmONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS 
§ 4.0S[3][a] (1988). The so-called "primary purpose" test actually differed little from the tradi-
tional appliClltion of the rule, which required a "rational business purpose," since under the 
primary purpose test courts usually demanded no more than a showing of "reasonable grounds 
to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed." Note, Protecting Shareholders 
Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 91 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1964, 
1970 n.4S (1984) (emphasis removed) (quoting Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, S06, 199 A.2d 
548, SSS (1964)). 
Application of the business judgment rule to protect a board's decision rather than the direc-
tors themselves has been termed the business judgment "doctrine." See Hinsey, Business Judg-
ment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and 
the Reality, S2 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 609, 611-13 (1984); Veasey, The New Incarnation of the 
Business Judgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. S03, SOS (1986). Courts 
largely ignore the distinction between the "rule" and the "doctrine," however, referring to both 
as the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, S06 
A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del. 1986). This Note will adhere to the terminology used by the courts. 
31. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 198S). Unocal is a leading case in or out of Delaware because many 
states look to Delaware for guidance on questions of corporate fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Dynam-
ics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 2SO, 2S3 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. on other grounds, 
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). Federal law generally does not govern the review of a target board's 
defensive strategies. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (198S); Santa Fe Indus. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The only federal securities law relevant to mergers and acquisitions 
is the Williams Act, lS U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 4S7 
U.S. 624 (1982). The Williams Act imposes certain disclosure duties in connection with tender 
offers and sizable open market stock purchases, and provides tendering sI1areholders the right to 
withdraw their shares and the right to receive the highest price paid in the tender offer, distrib-
uted among all tendered shares on a pro rata basis. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 23 
(1977). 
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reviewing a board's response to a hostile tender offer.32 The court held 
that during the initial phase of resistance to a nonnegotiated bid, or 
response phase, 33 the duties of care and loyalty require the board to 
play an active role in determining whether an offer is in the best inter-
ests of the corporation and its shareholders. 34 In certain cases, the 
duty of loyalty will demand that the board resist an offer that poses a 
threat to the shareholders or to corporate policy and effectiveness. 35 
Where directors satisfy their duties of care and loyalty in evaluating 
and responding to an offer, the Unocal test provides the judicial defer-
ence that is the hallmark of the traditional business judgment rule. 36 
Implicit in the Unocal court's application of the business judgment 
rule is a reluctance to conclude that target directors always stand in 
conflict with the corporation and its shareholders. 37 The Unocal test 
makes it evident that target directors, during the response phase, need 
not concern themselves solely with the wealth interests of shareholders 
who seek a short-term profit on their investment in the company.38 In 
responding to a takeover bid, a target board may determine that a 
32. 493 A.2d at 954; see also THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, at 77-78; 
Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REV. 851, 853, 865-66 (1986) [here-
inafter Comment, Unocal Corp.). The court further held that 
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine 
whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that 
respect a board's duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its 
decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the 
realm of business judgment. 
493 A.2d at 954. 
33. See note 8 supra. 
34. 493 A.2d at 954. The court explicitly rejected the suggestions of some scholars, e.g., 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 27, who have argued that the duty ofloyalty requires directors 
to remain strictly passive during a takeover attempt. 493 A.2d at 955 n.10. 
35. 493 A.2d at 955; accord Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 378 
(7th Cir. 1984); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 
F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Turner 13roadcasting Sys., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 901, 
908 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194-95 (N.D. Ill. 
1980), affd., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U,S. 1092 (1981); see also Note, supra note 
30, at 1968 & n.29 (citing also Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941)). Some courts disagree 
over whether the duty of loyalty requires active resistance to a harmful takeover bid. See, e.g., 
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259-60 & 1260 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
36. Delaware has widened use of the Unocal standard of review to cover decisions by direc-
tors to adopt defensive measures affecting a company's financial structure, such as poison-pill 
rights plans, in anticipation of a threat to the company from a possible future takeover attempt. 
Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
37. Directors who act with a conflict of interest are never entitled to the protections of the 
business judgment rule. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (business judg-
ment rule does not cover corporate decisions that are "tainted by a conflict of interest"), cert 
denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). Generally, target directors with a conflict of interest must prove 
the fairness in fact of any control transactions they have approved. See Part II infra. 
38. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-56 & n.11 ("While not a controlling factor, it also seems to 
us that a board may reasonably consider the basic stockholder interests at stake, including those 
of short term speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at the 
expense of the long term investor.") (emphasis added); cf. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's 
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979) (discussing directors' obligation to interests other than 
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policy of preserving the company's independence best serves long-term 
business planning.39 The board may act to protect corporate indepen-
dence by fending off potential acquirers, even where the price of a 
takeover bid or tender offer is at a premium over the current trading 
price for the company's stock.40 Moreover, directors in the response 
phase do not breach the duty of loyalty when they consider the effect 
of a proposed takeover on corporate constituencies other than share-
holders. 41 Satisfaction of the interests of creditors, for example, can 
increase value for shareholders who have a long-term investment in-
terest in the company as a going concern. 42 
At the same time, the Unocal test recognizes that defensive trans-
actions involve the possibility that directors have breached their duty 
of loyalty by acting primarily for the purpose of retaining control. 43 
This concern raises the question of director "good faith" - the subjec-
tive motivations of corporate directors. Directors lack good faith 
when they act for the purpose of entrenching themselves in office and 
without the honest belief that their actions are in the company's best 
interest.44 Subjective motivations, however, are difficult to prove. For 
that reason, the Unocal court shifted to the directors the burden of 
short-term shareholder gain). But see Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. crs Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
39. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987); see also Lip-
ton, supra note 38; Wander & LeCoque, supra note 1, at 42. 
40. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
41. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; accord GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. at 
1017-18; cf. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986) (argu-
ing that corporate directors should owe fiduciary duties to public bondholders as well as to equity 
shareholders); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984) (arguing that 
boards of directors should also represent nonshareholder interest groups). Some state antitake-
over statutes now expressly allow directors to evaluate a proposed takeover's impact on employ-
ees, suppliers, customers, and communities in which the corporation does business. See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act§ 408(B), 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon 
Supp.1988); Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Ap-
proach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW. 111 (1984). The constitutionality of 
certain variations of antitakeover statutes is still unsettled, see Note, The Constitutionality of 
Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. RE.v. 203 (1987), notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in crs Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), uphold-
ing Indiana's control share acquisition statute (which gives nonmanagement shareholders of 
companies incorporated in Indiana the right to vote on whether to enfranchise an acquirer of a 
large block of stock, thereby deterring a freezeout merger or second-tier acquisition that could be 
harmful to shareholders). Regardless of the constitutionality question, however, some argue that 
it is imperative for courts to recognize the policies represented by such legislation when adjudi-
cating matters of state corporation law. See, e.g., Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The 
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. RE.v. 1, 10 (1986). 
42. See Lipton, supra note 38, at 109-12. 
43. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (citing Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22, 187 A.2d 405, 
409 (1962)). Here, the court echoes the language used by courts applying the older primary 
purpose test. See note 30 supra. 
44. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, at 14-15. 
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showing that their conduct was proper, a fact presumed by the tradi-
tional business judgment rule. 45 The Unocal court created a two-
prong test: the first prong directs an inquiry into the board's decision-
making process; the second prong examines the reasonableness of de-
fensive measures approved by the board. If the target directors satisfy 
both prongs of the test, the burden then shifts to the plaintiffs to show 
that the primary purpose behind the board's defensive tactics was en-
trenchment of incumbent management, rather than a bona fide busi-
ness purpose, such as protection of shareholder welfare or corporate 
effectiveness. 46 
Under the first prong of the Unocal test, target directors who have 
approved a defensive measure must show that they had reason to be-
lieve the resisted offer posed a threat to the corporate enterprise.47 
The court stated that directors will satisfy this prong "by showing 
good faith and reasonable investigation."48 In practice, the first prong 
of the test examines whether the directors have undertaken a reason-
able investigation into the relative merits of the acquisition offer they 
are attempting to block (i.e., whether they have acted in accordance 
with the duty of care).49 The duty of care inquiry focuses on the objec-
tive conduct of target directors rather than on their subjective motiva-
tions. Here the court will review the process by which the directors 
have arrived at their decision to oppose the offer. Reasonable investi-
gation usually involves a thorough and detached analysis by the board 
and generally must include an evaluation of the acquisition proposal 
by an impartial financial adviser. 50 The presence of objective factors 
tending to show due care on the part of the target directors operates as 
45. See 493 A.2d at 954-55; Comment, supra note 13, at 554-55. 
46. See 493 A.2d at 955; CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 437 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 635 F. Supp. 1174, 1176, 1181 
(N.D. Ill.), supplemented on reh., 638 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill.), affd. in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). 
47. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
48. 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 
(1964)). 
49. Use of the hackneyed incantation "good faith and reasonable investigation" perpetuates 
confusion. The court shifted the initial burden onto the directors for the very reason that it 
doubted their ability to prove their own good faith. Cf. Comment, Unocal Corp., supra note 32, 
at 867 ("[T]he court's formulation of the reasonable perception standard reintroduces the busi-
ness judgment rule into the test of whether the business judgment rule should be applied at all."). 
This reading of Unocal is consistent with the usual application of the business judgment rule that 
presumes loyalty and scrutinizes the directors' decisionmaking process to ensure due care. See 
R. GILSON, supra note 11, at 112 ("Directors who do not satisfy a business judgment review 
violate their duty of care, not their duty of loyalty.") (emphasis in original); see also Wander & 
LeCoque, supra note 1, at 38-41. To understand the degree of diligence required by the duty of 
care, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
50. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla 
and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 789 (1984); Note, The Business Judgment Rule, Due 
Care and Experts: How Much Information is Enough?, 7 J.L. & CoM. 225 (1987); Note, Invest-
ment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119 (1986). 
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a surrogate for proof of good faith.51 In addition, the court in Unocal 
emphasized that a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation 
is strengthened where the decision to oppose a tender offer has been 
made by a committee of outside, independent directors.52 The inde-
pendence of the corporate decisionmakers - that is, the extent to 
which the members of the board who voted to resist the takeover are 
disassociated from management - is one objective item of evidence 
directly relevant to whether the primary purpose behind the defensive 
tactic was entrenchment. In sum, a reasonably cautious board that is 
aware of its obligations under the duty of care will have little difficulty 
satisfying this threshold, procedural inquiry. The first prong is simply 
meant to identify some rational business purpose behind the board's 
actions sufficient to overcome the suspicion of self-dealing.53 This in-
quiry is borrowed from older Delaware cases,54 which required target 
directors to show reasonable investigation where an inference of self-
interest existed. ss 
The real innovation in the Unocal decision was the addition of the 
second prong, under which the target board must show that its defen-
sive measures are reasonable in relation to the perceived threat posed 
by the takeover. 56 The concern behind the reasonableness require-
ment is that directors acting in the heat of a takeover battle may abuse 
the discretion accorded them under the business judgment rule. 57 This 
prong of the Unocal test "entails an analysis by the directors of the 
nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise."58 
Takeovers present a variety of potential dangers that may threaten a 
51. Cf Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 
391 (1985) ("In determining whether management acted for a corporate, rather than a personal, 
benefit, ... the court in Che.ff considered facts that were more probative of whether management 
exercised due care.'') (discussing Chelfv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 505-06, 199 A.2d 548, 554-SS 
(Del. 1964)). 
52. 493 A.2d at 955; see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 
1343 (Del. 1987) ("with the independent directors in the majority, proof that the board acted in 
good faith and upon reasonable investigation is materially enhanced"); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 
531, 537 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985). But see 
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. on other 
grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987): 
When managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over of the corporation by an 
investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover attempt succeeds, they have a clear conflict 
of interest, and it is not cured by vesting the power of decision in a board of directors in 
which insiders are a minority. 
53. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch. 
1986). 
54. See, e.g., Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 
Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962). 
55. See note 51 supra. 
56. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
51. See 493 A.2d at 955 ("A corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any 
perceived threat by any Draconian means available.''). 
58. 493 A.2d at 955. 
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target's corporate enterprise. 59 The court provided several examples 
of possible factors a board may consider in addition to basic share-
holder wealth interests: "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and 
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituen-
cies' other than shareholders ... , the risk of nonconsummation, and 
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange/'60 A defensive 
transaction must be a reasonably balanced response to such an identifi-
able threat. 61 In addition, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings 62 clarified the reasonableness prong by highlighting the restriction 
. that takeover defenses must be rationally related to shareholder 
benefit.63 
The second prong of the Unocal test appears more substantive than 
the threshold duty of care inquiry. 64 The reasonableness prong allows 
a court to strike down defensive tactics where the potential harmful 
effects of the tactics outweigh the threat identified by the board. 65 A 
board may not approve, for example, transactions that are themselves 
59. These dangers may be associated with, for example, a grossly inadequate price, a coercive 
or two-tiered offer, an offer supported by questionable or low-grade financing, a bust-up or boot-
strap acquisition, the extortion of greenmail, the simple disruption of long-term corporate plan-
ning, or other more general social and economic ill effects. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, 
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE AND FAIRNESS ACT OF 1987, S. 
REP. No. 265, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 8-18, 70-80, reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1268, 
pt. 2 (Jan. 13, 1988); Scherer, Takeovers: Present and Future Dangers, BROOKINGS REV., Win-
ter-Spring 1986, at 15; Lipton, Takeover Abuses Mortgage the Future, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 
16, col. 4. See also Coffee, supra note 41, at 40-73; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Board-
room: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1024 n.30 (1981) [hereinafter Lipton, 
Takeover Bids Update]. On the dangers associated in particular with greenmail, see Comment, 
Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be Stopped?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271 (1986); Note, Greenmail· 
Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REv. 
1045 (1985). 
60. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
61. In Unocal, the target company's directors approved a discriminatory self-tender offer in 
response to a two-tiered tender offer from T. Boone Pickens's Mesa Petroleum. The Unocal 
board had concluded after reasonable investigation that Mesa's offer would coerce shareholders 
caught in the back-end of the tender offer to accept debt securities worth less than the cash 
received by first-tier offerees. The court upheld as a reasonable response to this threat a self-
tender offer that was open to all shareholders except Mesa. 493 A.2d at 956-57. 
62. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
63. 506 A.2d at 182. This restriction does not undercut the board's ability under Unocal to 
resist unsolicited acquisition offers in favor of corporate independence. The board in responding 
to a prospective takeover may reasonably determine that a policy of independence will confer 
benefit on shareholders in the long term. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text. 
64. Cf R. GILSON, supra note 11, at 112-16 (Unoca/'s second-step "proportionality test" 
may be applied more rigorously than the "largely rhetorical" primary purpose first step.) (dis-
cussing AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986)); 
Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 
CORNELL L. REv. 117, 118 (1986) (the reasonableness requirement "overwhelms" the first prong 
of the Unocal test and "[i]n effect, this new test ... becomes the sole and complete standard, and 
the court should recognize it as such"). 
65. Some courts will weigh the claimed benefits of a takeover defense against the impact of 
the defense on the prospective acquirer and the financial burden it will impose on the target. 
E.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 638 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Ill.), affd in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). 
288 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:276 
coercive for shareholders, 66 that block any and all potential tender of-
fers, 67 or that usurp for the board all control over the company's 
destiny.68 While this balancing test appears to involve the potential 
for a more searching analysis, Delaware courts, in practice, show great 
deference toward a target board's reasonable determination that an of-
fer poses a threat to the corporate enterprise. 69 Whether the directors' 
perception of a threat is reasonable often turns on the coercive nature 
of the offer or the likelihood that it is motivated by a desire for green-
mail profits.70 Where the offeror is a well-known corporate raider 
who, in the past, has used coercive tactics to extract big payoffs from 
vulnerable targets, the courts are likely to agree with the board's as-
sessment that a threat exists, and will uphold almost any response-
phase defense. 71 Moreover, Delaware courts usually will strike down 
a defensive device that is aimed at thwarting a noncoercive offer only 
when the defense is itself grossly abusive of the shareholders' welfare 
or their ability to make choices about fundamental corporate change.72 
In a recent opinion, Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 73 
the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that the second prong of the 
Unocal test may simply be a specific application of the first prong to 
the particular defensive tactics employed by the target board. The 
court stated that the directors' entire burden of proof under Unocal is 
satisfied by a single showing: that they exercised good faith and rea-
sonable investigation in analyzing the nature of the takeover bid and 
its effect on the corporate enterprise. 74 In Newmont Mining, the court 
66. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113·14 (Del. Ch. 
1986). 
67. See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234-39 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986); Dynamics Corp. of Arn. v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 250, 259 (CTS rights plan 
"effectively precludes a hostile takeover, and thus allows management to take the shareholders 
hostage"), revd. on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); see also Wander & LeCoque, supra note 
1, at 47; cf. Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353-55 (Del. 1985) (upholding a 
defensive purchase rights plan as not blocking all tender offers). 
68. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984). 
69. Cf., e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342-44 (Del. 
1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del. 1986); Mo-
ran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985). 
70. See Oesterle, supra note 64, at 148. 
71. See, e.g., Newmont Mining, 535 A.2d at 1342: 
Newmont ... specifically recognized that Mr. Pickens, who controls Ivanhoe, had been 
involved in several attempts to acquire and break-up other corporations, resulting in the 
payment of"greenmail" or severe restructuring of the target companies. The series oflvan-
hoe maneuvers ... were all viewed by the defendants as classic elements of Mr. Pickens' 
typical modus operandi. Thus, the Newmont board could properly conclude that the Ivan-
hoe tender offer was not in the shareholders' best interests or those of their company. 
(citations omitted). 
72. Cf., e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (directors could not undertake a coercive self-tender offer in response to a hostile offer that 
was neither inadequate nor coercive). 
73. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). 
74. 535 A.2d at 1341: 
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found that the board had reason to conclude that a partial tender offer 
from T. Boone Pickens posed a threat to Newmont and its sharehold-
ers. To avoid this threat, the board had embarked on a strategy in-
volving a standstill agreement and a defensive "street sweep."75 The 
court upheld these actions under the reasonableness prong of the Uno-
cal test by finding that they were essential elements in the board's plan 
to prevent Newmont's takeover.76 Newmont Mining therefore estab-
lishes that business judgment rule protection under the Unocal test 
will primarily depend upon the target board's reasonable perception of 
a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. Where such a threat is 
shown, defensive tactics will be upheld if they are reasonably necessary 
to defeat the threatened takeover. 
B. Judicial Review of the Corporate Auction 
Once an auction has begun, 77 the target board's responsibilities al-
ter significantly and its discretion is substantially curtailed. When re-
viewing director conduct in the auction phase of a takeover, courts 
must first consider the Revlon holding. Under the Revlon decision, 
when sale or breakup of the target becomes "inevitable," the directors 
may no longer concern themselves with defending corporate policy 
and effectiveness but must put all efforts into selling the company to 
the highest bidder. 78 At this stage, the board becomes an "auctioneer" 
charged with supervising an orderly and profitable disposition of the 
shareholders' property.79 The Revlon decision also directs a court to 
ensure that a board involved in an auction deals fairly and equally 
with competing bidders. The board may not play favorites by denying 
one bidder negotiating advantages accorded to another.80 The require-
This Court has addressed [the] potential for conflict by placing upon the directors the bur-
den of proving that they have not acted solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate 
themselves in office, that the threatened takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness, and that the defensive measures adopted are reasonable in relation to the 
threat posed. The target directors must satisfy these prerequisites by showing good faith 
and reasonable investigation before enjoying the presumptions afforded by the business judg-
ment rule. This requires directorial analysis of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect 
on the corporate enterprise. 
(citations omitted). 
75. Newmont entered into a standstill agreement with its largest shareholder, Gold Fields. 
Gold Fields agreed to limit its holdings in Newmont to 49.9% of Newmont's outstanding stock 
and its representation on the Newmont board to 40% of the directors. In return, Newmont 
distributed a $33 per share dividend which enabled Gold Fields to "sweep the street" for 
Newmont shares and obtain the ownership percentage allowed under its standstill agreement. 
535 A.2d at 1340. As a result of this agreement, Newmont had created a "white squire" capable 
of blocking Pickens's takeover bid. For a definition of "white squire," see note 148 infra. 
76. 535 A.2d at 1343-44. 
77. For a discussion regarding when the auction phase commences, see note 8 supra. 
78. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see also 
note 8 supra. 
79. 506 A.2d at 182. 
80. 506 A.2d at 184: 
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ment of fair dealing follows necessarily from the board's responsibility 
in supervising an orderly auction for the purpose of obtaining the best 
sale price for shareholders. The goal of the Revlon analysis is to allow 
the market to drive up the price paid for the target company free of 
directorial favoritism. 81 Accompanying this change in responsibilities 
is a corollary shift in the focus of directors' fiduciary duties. Directors 
in an auction owe their duties of care and loyalty exclusively to the 
shareholders because they are now acting as bargaining agents in ne-
gotiating a cash-out of the shareholders' equity interests. In the auc-
tion phase, therefore, directors breach their duty of loyalty when they 
favor any consideration other than short-term shareholder wealth 
maximization. 82 
While protecting the market for corporate control from all inter-
ests that may interfere with shareholders' wealth, the Revlon test con-
tinues to insist that "the board remain free to negotiate in the 
fulfillment of" its duties. 83 The court rejected the notion that a board 
should stand by passively while market forces control the auction. In 
the auction phase, just as in the response phase identified by the Uno-
cal test, "[t]he directors' role remains an active one, changed only in 
the respect that they are charged with the duty of selling the company 
at the highest price attainable for the stockholders' benefit. " 84 Revlon 
leaves to the target board the discretion to decide how best to maxi-
mize that benefit. In the auction phase, the business judgment rule 
will not shield actions of directors that go beyond this circumscribed 
discretion, even where the directors can show that their purpose was 
not to retain control. But the rule will protect the proper exercise of 
board discretion in the auction phase; it will protect from further judi-
cial review many decisions about whether and how to generate a 
higher price for the company. 85 Without the business judgment rule, a 
board's ability to conduct an auction would be wholly at the discretion 
Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable 
when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but when bidders make rela-
tively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot 
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions. 
The court here seems to indicate that the duty of fair dealing is triggered by receipt of two or 
more competitive offers or by a recognition that the company must be dissolved and its assets 
sold off. Cf. note 116 infra. 
81. See 506 A.2d at 184 ("Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the 
target's shareholders the best price available for their equity."). 
82. See 506 A.2d at 182 (by favoring noteholders, "the directors breached their primary duty 
of loyalty"). It should be noted that commentators have had difficulty identifying whether Rev-
lon was decided on the basis of the duty of loyalty or the duty of care. See, e.g., R. GILSON, 
supra note 11, at 112 n.11; Comment, supra note 13, at 549-50. 
83. 506 A.2d at 184. 
84. 506 A.2d at 184 n.16; see also note 34 supra. 
85. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 1, at 37: "[Revlon] indicates that, in effect, the busi-
ness judgment rule will only be applied to board decisions on how to maximize the price of the 
shares once an auction has begun." 
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of a reviewing court. The board could not play an independent, active 
role in seeking out competitive bids. 86 
In Revlon, the court reviewed decisions made by Revlon's board 
during the corporate auction to determine whether these decisions 
qualified for business judgment rule protection. 87 Ultimately, the 
court concluded that the directors had violated their auction-phase 
duties by cutting short an active auction out of concern for notehold-
ers and withheld the protection of the rule. 88 The Revlon board ab-
ruptly ended competitive bidding between a white knight, Forstmann 
Little & Co., and Pantry Pride, a hostile bidder, by approving an ac-
quisition proposal from Forstmann. The Forstmann proposal in-
cluded a lock-up option, a no-shop provision (giving Forstmann 
exclusive negotiating privileges), and a cancellation fee.89 The board 
approved the proposal primarily because it contained a promise by 
Forstmann to support the value of notes issued by Revlon in a previ-
ous defensive exchange offer. 90 The company's shareholders gained 
little if anything from the Forstmann proposal, since Forstmann's of-
fer was only marginally higher than Pantry Pride's last bid and accept-
ance of the proposal meant a premature end to a lively auction.91 
In reviewing the board's decision to approve the Forstmann propo-
sal, the Revlon court relied on the Unocal two-prong test.92 The court 
held that the directors failed to satisfy either prong of the Unocal test. 
Because they had favored noteholders over shareholders, the directors 
could not make the good faith showing required by the first prong. 93 
86. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 
35 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1982) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Reply and Extension]; Bebchuk,Tender Offers, 
supra note 18; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response ta Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231 (1980). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and 
Sunk Casts in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 27. 
87. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-82. 
88. See 506 A.2d at 182. 
89. 506 A.2d at 178-79; see also note 8 supra. 
90. To deter an initial cash tender offer by Pantry Pride, Revlon had undertaken its own self-
tender offer in which it had bought back over a quarter of its outstanding common stock in 
exchange for debt securities. 506 A.2d at 177. Under the terms of these newly issued notes, 
Revlon's merger with Forstmann would constitute a waiver of the notes' protective covenants. 
As a result of the public announcement of the intended merger, the trading value of the notes 
dropped substantially, and irate noteholders threatened to sue Revlon's directors. 506 A.2d at 
178-79, 183-84. The directors hoped to escape possible liability by arranging a merger agreement 
with Forstmann that contained a promise by Forstmann to guarantee the value of the notes. 
91. The merger agreement with Forstmann abruptly ended a bidding war that promised even 
higher returns for shareholders. 506 A.2d at 184. Pantry Pride's CEO Ronald Perelman had 
made clear his intention to better any offer made by Forstmann. 506 A.2d at 178. Yet Revlon 
accepted Forstmann's last offer without giving Pantry Pride an opportunity to beat it. 
92. 506 A.2d at 180. 
93. See 506 A.2d at 182: 
The original threat posed by Pantry Pride - the break-up of the company - had be-
come a reality which even the directors embraced. Selective dealing to fend off a hostile but 
determined bidder was no longer a proper objective. Instead, obtaining the highest price for 
the benefit of the stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director action. 
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Under the second prong, they could not show that their actions were 
reasonable in relation to a threat to the company, because the board 
itself had voted to break up Revlon Qeaving nothing to defend), and 
the noteholders were already sufficiently protected from loss by their 
contractual agreements with the company.94 
The Unocal test, however, is not an adequate standard for uphold-
ing the special duties of directors in a corporate auction, and applica-
tion of the test in an auction setting only confuses the analysis. The 
Unocal test does not require maximizing shareholder value in the 
short term95 or treating hostile bidders fairly.96 Rather, the Unocal 
test balances the reasonableness of measures taken by a board in re-
sponse to a takeover attempt against the threat posed by the takeover. 
This test is tailored to the response phase when a board in its discre-
tion may pursue a policy of corporate independence through defensive 
measures. If the threat to the corporate enterprise is sufficiently great, 
the directors need not negotiate with the hostile bidder; they may keep 
the target independent by engaging in, among other things, discrimi-
natory stock transactions, asset sales and reorganizations, or exclusive 
dealings with third parties.97 The Revlon test, in contrast, rules out 
any consideration of a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness.98 
This shift in emphasis is triggered when the target board manifests an 
Thus, the Revlon board could not make the requisite showing of good faith by preferring the 
noteholders and ignoring its duty of loyalty to the shareholders. The rights of the former 
already were fixed by contract. The noteholders required no further protection, and when 
the Revlon board entered into an auction-ending lock-up agreement with Forstmann on the 
basis of impermissible considerations at the expense of the shareholders, the directors 
breached their primary duty of loyalty. 
(citations omitted). In this regard, the court noted that the board did not include a majority of 
outside, independent directors. 506 A.2d at 176 n.3. 
94. See 506 A.2d at 182-83. 
95. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text. 
96. The court jn Unocal held that a target board's duty ofloyalty to a particular shareholder 
is superseded by the board's duty to protect the corporate enterprise where that shareholder is 
seeking to acquire the company by a takeover that threatens corporate policy or effectiveness. 
493 A.2d at 958. If the board may discriminate against such a shareholder, it goes without 
saying that the board is not required by Unocal to deal fairly with a bidder that has not yet 
gained a stake in the company. 
97. Newmont Mining illustrates the liberality of the Unocal test. Because Pickens's bid was 
reasonably perceived as coercive and inadequate, the Newmont directors were justified in main-
taining the company's "independence" by entering into an exclusive deal with Gold Fields 
whereby Newmont kindly financed (by selling off undervalued assets) Gold Fields's acquisition 
of a near majority of Newmont shares. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 
1334 (Del. 1987). Newmont certainly did not deal fairly and equally as between Pickens and 
Gold Fields. But this unequal dealing was irrelevant under Unocal. The directors had identified 
a danger in the Pickens bid and reacted against that danger to protect the company's indepen-
dence for the long-term benefit of its shareholders - no matter that the non-Gold Fields share-
holders retained only a .1% margin of control. The Newmont board was not expected to 
negotiate with Pickens. 
98. 506 A.2d at 182: 
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate 
entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. 
This significantly altered the board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no 
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intention to sell or break up the company and takes some action in 
furtherance of that goal. 99 
The court denied the Revlon directors business judgment rule pro-
tection primarily because they did not fulfi11 their responsibilities in 
facilitating the auction process they had initiated.100 From the begin-
ning of the auction, they dealt preferentially with Forstmann to the 
exclusion of Pantry Pride. As the court found, "Forstmann was given 
every negotiating advantage that Pantry Pride had been denied: coop-
eration from management, access to :financial data, and the exclusive 
opportunity to present merger proposals directly to the board of direc-
tors." 101 Finally, the board's lock-up agreement with Forstmann ter-
minated the auction, stifling Pantry Pride's ability to make a higher 
offer. The Revlon analysis emphasizes the manner in which the board 
conducts the corporate auction, not the magnitude of the threat facing 
the targeted business. The board must act to stimulate and sustain 
competitive bidding, not foreclose it; and must deal fairly with com-
peting bidders. In Revlon, this simple analysis was clouded by the fact 
that in addition to misconduct that violated their special auction-phase 
responsibilities, the Revlon directors breached their underlying duty of 
loyalty. They favored nonshareholder interests after sale of the com-
pany became inevitable (the point after which benefiting other corpo-
rate constituencies cannot rationally benefit the shareholders who are 
about to sell their stock), and they did so in order to protect them-
selves from litigation.102 Moreover, the board's decisions were not 
made by a majority of outside, independent members. 103 In the end, it 
is accurate to conclude that the fact situation in Revlon did not pro-
vide a favorable occasion to refine a workable test for applying busi-
ness judgment rule protection in an auction phase.104 
longer faced threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, 
from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became moot. 
99. See note 116 infra. 
100. In contrasting Revlon with Unocal and Newmont Mining, it is significant to note that the 
Revlon board, like the boards of Unocal Corp. and Newmont, was threatened with a hostile bid 
from a notorious corporate raider - in this case, Ronald Perelman. The difference in outcomes 
may betray a special antipathy in Delaware toward T. Boone Pickens, or it may underscore the 
irrelevance of the threat concept in the context of a Revlon auction. 
101. 506 A.2d at 184; see also Wander & LeCoque, supra note 1, at 36-37. 
102. See note 90 supra. 
103. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 n.3. 
104. Cf. R. GILSON, supra note 11, at 112: "And we learn little more about the nature of the 
proportionality test from Revlon. There the court found that the Revlon directors violated their 
duty ofloyalty in agreeing to the lock-up, thereby rendering the new two-step review irrelevant." 
In a more recent case, Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., Civ. No. 8486, slip op. (Del. Ch. 
May 19, 1986), reprinted in, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 282 (1987), the chancery court of Delaware did 
confer business judgment rule protection on a target board's conduct of a corporate auction. The 
Sea-Land court refused to issue a temporary restraining order against directors who satisfied 
their auction-phase duties by supervising the ultimate sale of the company through a competitive 
bidding contest without discriminating among bidders. This case demonstrates the importance 
of preserving the business judgment rule in judicial review of a corporate auction. However, the 
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C. Target Resistance in the Auction Phase 
May a board that has announced its intention to sell the company 
continue to resist a bidder in order to solicit additional competitive 
offers? In a Revlon auction, where two or more potential acquirers are 
bidding head-to-head for the company, the requirement of fair dealing 
may preclude using devices that discourage one of the bidders from 
pursuing the merger. The lock-up option and cancellation fee ap-
proved by the Revlon board are examples of devices that may be un-
fair during an active auction. 105 But a defensive measure might be 
employed properly during an auction where, for example, a potential 
acquirer attempts to circumvent the auction process by making a 
tender offer directly to shareholders. Rational shareholders will 
tender their shares when the price offered includes a control premium, 
so that tender offers may be inherently coercive. 106 A tender offer 
could undermine the board's ability to negotiate an auction that might 
result in a deal more favorable to shareholders. Revlon imposes on 
directors the responsibility of auctioning the company for the highest 
price attainable and, at the same time, allows them the discretion to 
fulfill this responsibility. Such discretion logically includes the power 
to stimulate a more competitive auction. Under certain circum-
stances, it may also include the authority to resist a tender offer in 
order to spur the offeror back into the auction process and sustain the 
"level playing field" 107 among participating bidders.108 
In CRTF Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, 109 for example, a 
Sea-Land court, deciding under expedited conditions only the narrow issue of whether a tempo-
rary restraining order was justified, made no attempt to craft a new business judgment rule stan-
dard of review. 
105. Both the lockup option and cancellation fee contained in the Forstmann proposal were 
designed to be triggered upon another party's acquiring a fixed percentage of Revlon. The lock-
up option gave Forstmann the right to purchase two Revlon divisions at a price substantially 
below estimated value if another acquirer got 40% of Revlon's stock. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. 
Forstmann was to receive the $25 million cancellation fee in the event the deal fell through or 
another acquirer amassed a greater than 19.9% stake in the company. 506 A.2d at 178. These 
devices were part of "the overall plan to thwart Pantry Pride's efforts." 506 A.2d at 184. Like a 
poison pill, the lockup option and cancellation fee were effective means of preventing Pantry 
Pride from making a tender offer before the merger with Forstmann could be consummated. 
Pantry Pride had little choice but to challenge their validity in court. 
106. See Lipton, supra note 38, at 113-15; see also Booth, The Promise of State Takeover 
Statutes, 86 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1635, 1646-47 (1988) (arguing that tender offers, even all cash offers 
for any and all shares, are always coercive because individual shareholders lack sufficient infor-
mation or bargaining power to resist tendering). 
107. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, at 85. 
108. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 439-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(upholding validity of a poison pill used to defeat a coercive tender offer for the purpose of 
further promoting an ongoing auction); see also Oesterle, supra note 64, at 150 ("When more 
than one bidder is involved, the negotiation model suggests that the target may temporarily block 
one bidder to encourage others or may neutralize the advantage that a partial tender offer has 
over an any-or-all offer.") (footnote omitted). 
109. 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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federal district court upheld a poison pill defense employed in the 
midst of a bidding contest. The court relied on Revlon's affirmation of 
an active role for directors in the auction phase, and held that a rule 
requiring the target to let down all defenses once an auction begins 
would be inconsistent with that active role. 110 Federated's poison pill 
allowed the directors to spur on the bidding, driving up the price of-
fered by the rival bidders, Robert Campeau and R.H. Macy & Co. 
The pill prevented Campeau from subverting the auction through the 
use of a preemptive tender offer. As the court put it, use of the pill 
"provide[ d] the directors with a shield to fend off coercive offers, and 
with a gavel to run an auction."111 
Where the board has decided to sell the company under pressure 
from a single persistent offeror, the board might resist an immediate 
takeover in order to solicit other offers which could generate a compet-
itive auction. It makes sense that a court would allow the board even 
wider discretion where there is only one bidder, since the board's ac-
tions may increase the competitive alternatives for shareholders and 
would not run the risk of chilling an already active bidding contest.112 
But in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (CTS II), 113 the Sev-
enth Circuit, construing Delaware law, questioned a board's authority 
under Revlon to resist a takeover with any defensive measure like a 
poison pill once the board has decided to sell the company.114 Writing 
for the panel, Judge Posner demanded extensive proof regarding the 
fairness to shareholders of a rights plan that enabled the CTS board to 
block acquisition bids below a fixed price.115 The standard of review 
110. 683 F. Supp. at 441. 
111. 683 F. Supp. at 439. Not surprisingly, the court in Federated Dept. Stores looked to 
Unocal to support its conclusion that the directors were justified in fearing the coercive threat of 
a tender offer from Campeau. See 683 F. Supp. at 439-40. But this "threat" was not a threat in 
the Unocal sense - a threat to corporate policy or effectiveness. Rather, a tender offer by 
Campeau would be an impairment to the directors' ability to conduct the auction in fulfillment of 
their Revlon duties. 
112. Cf. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(target's offer to exchange debt instruments for 35% of its own shares "was an alternative avail-
able for the stockholders' consideration" which "was not intended to and does not discriminate 
against bidders for control"). 
113. 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). 
114. See 805 F.2d at 716-17. Poison pills, or shareholder rights plans, are devices "by which 
shareholders receive the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substantial premium on 
the occurrence of a stated triggering event." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 
A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (citing Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). 
Directors of Delaware corporations are permitted to adopt rights plans under statutory provi-
sions broadly authorizing transactions in the corporation's stock. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351; see 
also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §§tr. 122(13), 141 (1983). Poison pills are an effective and widely 
used deterrent to an unwanted takeover. For a detailed description of the various species of pill, 
see SEC Office of the Chief Economist, A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-1986 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986). See also Helman & Junewicz, 
Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus. LAW. 771 (1987); Fleisher & Golden, Poison Pill, Natl. L.J., 
Feb. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 2; Note, supra note 30. 
115. The rights plan approved by the CTS board was a "back-end" or equity "flip-in" pill. 
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in CTS II seems to entail a significantly greater scrutiny than Revlon 
requires, suggesting that some courts may deny the protections of the 
business judgment rule altogether whenever a target company employs 
defenses after a takeover has entered the auction phase.116 
The CTS rights plan was designed to insure an orderly auction of 
the company. 117 The plan was adopted in light of Dynamics Corp.'s 
acquisition, by tender offer, of a substantial stake in crs. 11s A special 
See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CIS Corp. (CIS II), 635 F. Supp. 1174, 1176-77 (N.D. Ill.), 
supplemented on reh., 638 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd. in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 
805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). Under the plan, rights were distributed to stockholders that, when 
triggered, would enable them to exchange each share of their stock for a $50 debenture, payable 
in one year at 10% interest. The rights would be triggered upon the acquisition by any share-
holder of 28% of CIS's outstanding stock, and would not be distributed to the triggering share· 
holder. At the time the plan was approved, Dynamics held 27.5% of crs after completing a 
tender offer at $43 per share. The rights were good for one year and could be cancelled at any 
time by the board or automatically if anyone made a cash tender offer of $50 or more for all 
outstanding shares. CTS II, 805 F.2d at 707. Generally, flip-in pills have been upheld when 
"employed in the midst of a battle for control to place a specific value on the company in the face 
of an ongoing, inadequate offer." Phillips Shareholders Settle for New Pill and Bylaw but No 
Cash, Corporate Control Alert, Aug. 1986, at 1; see also Fraidin & Golden, The Value Assurance 
Plan: A Pill Without Any Poison, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 35, col. 4. But see Edelman v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899, slip op. at 14-15 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1986) (noting "serious legal 
challenges" to a notes rights plan); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 
1259, 1260 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rights plan "questionable" and "troublesome" as possible 
breach of fiduciary duty). For recent, infonnative commentary on these rights plans, see Clem-
ens, Poison Debt: The New Takeover Defense, 42 Bus. LAW. 747 (1987). 
116. There is a significant question, however, as to whether the attempted takeover of crs 
had even entered an auction phase. In Revlon, unlike CTS II, the court's finding that sale of the 
company was inevitable was conclusively supported by the board's willingness to break up Rev-
lon and grant lockup options on its various divisions. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79, 182. In 
CTS II, it should be noted, the district court, which initially approved the crs flip-in plan, did 
not find that the plan had been adopted in an auction phase: 
Revlon is also distinguishable in that the rights plan in that case instigated a bidding war 
and caused the unfriendly bidder to raise its price; crs is still without a buyer. In this case, 
however, there was no active bid to acquire 100% of the company at the time the plan was 
adopted, and the comparison is therefore somewhat tenuous. 
CTS II, 638 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd. in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 805 F.2d 
705 (7th Cir. 1986). 
Assuming the CTS II takeover had not entered the auction phase, under Delaware law the 
crs board would only have had to satisfy the response-phase Unocal test to get the benefit of the 
business judgment rule. Cf. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81 (rights plan similar to the CIS pill, 
adopted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation before the auction phase, held valid as it 
"afforded a measure of protection consistent with the directors' fiduciary duty in facing a take-
over threat perceived as detrimental to corporate interests"). The court in CTS II found that an 
auction phase had commenced when the directors of crs decided to sell the company. See CTS 
II, 805 F.2d at 716-17 ("Although the .•• poison pill in this case is said to be modeled on the one 
upheld in [Revlon], and indeed bears a family resemblance to it, Revlon had adopted its poison 
pill before the directors decided to sell the company •••. The ••. poison pill in the present case 
came after CIS's board decided to sell the company.") (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
It was also significant that the crs directors had announced to shareholders their intention to 
auction off the company in connection with their own reelection to the board and had repre-
sented that the rights plan was part of their strategy to maximize the sale price. See 805 F.2d at 
707. 
117. See CTS II, 638 F. Supp. at 805. 
118. Dynamics Corp. was able to complete its tender offer following the court's earlier opin-
ion, Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CIS Corp. (CIS I), 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.), affd., 794 F.2d 
250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), enjoining CIS's initial poison 
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committee of outside directors had determined that the best way to 
maximize the value of stock held by the remaining shareholders was 
through a sale of the entire company by auction, and that Dynamics 
was in a position to thwart such a sale.119 The committee recom-
mended the rights ·plan as a means of keeping Dynamics at bay while 
management sought white-knight bidders to generate a competitive 
auction. 120 The district court denied a preliminary injunction re-
quested by Dynamics, holding that the board's decision to sell CTS 
and its adoption of the plan were entitled to the protections of the 
business judgment rule under the Unocal test. The court held that the 
board showed good faith and reasonable investigation in its decision-
making process. This showing was supported by the appointment of a 
special committee that had carefully and thoroughly investigated 
shareholder wealth interests, including the ability of Dynamics to 
block future bids. The court was further impressed by the committee's 
solicitation of advice from investment bankers Smith Barney.121 The 
court also found that the valuation of the company for purposes of the 
exercise price in the rights plan reasonably represented the high end of 
value over the next year. 122 With respect to the second prong of the 
Unocal test, the court held that the board's actions were reasonable 
responses to the threat posed by Dynamics. The rights plan did not 
insulate management from all hostile offers, and it satisfied the board's 
responsibility to maximize value for shareholders because it was aimed 
at facilitating an orderly auction. 123 Dynamics was unable to rebut 
the board's evidence by showing that the rights plan was adopted for 
the self-interest of the directors. The court found that the directors 
were committed to a sale of CTS, which iilcluded the prospect that 
they could eventually be replaced by a new board.124 
These conclusions did not satisfy the Seventh Circuit. Judge Pos-
pill. See CTS II, 805 F.2d at 707. Dynamics did not express an intention of taking over CTS, see 
CTS II, 638 F. Supp. at 806, but did wage a proxy contest for control of the crs board. CTS II. 
635 F. Supp. at 1176. In connection with the proxy vote, both the incumbent board and Dynam-
ics announced an intention to sell the company if elected. 638 F. Supp. at 805-06. 
119. CTS ]/, 635 F. Supp. at 1177. The committee of outside directors determined that 
Dynamics could thwart the company's efforts to maximize value in an auction either by acquir-
ing more stock, thereby gaining a blocking position that could deter any potential bidders, or by 
engaging in a second-step tender offer at less than fair value. See 635 F. Supp. at 1177. 
120. See 635 F. Supp. at 1177. 
121. See 635 F. Supp. at 1178-80. The court found that the advice provided by the bankers 
was conjectural but reasonable and supported by second opinions, and, therefore, the court re-
fused to second-guess it. 635 F. Supp. at 1179. 
122. 635 F. Supp. at 1179. 
123. 635 F. Supp. at 1180. In addition, the court found that the potential for a large amount 
of issued debt under the rights plan was reasonable given the low probability the rights would be 
triggered and the company's ability to restructure existing debt to mitigate the effects. 635 F. 
Supp. at 1180-81. 
124. 635 F. Supp. at 1181. The court also refused to equate the board's hostility toward 
Dynamics with a purpose of entrenchment. 635 F. Supp. at 1181. 
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ner remanded the case for a thorough analysis of "the relationship 
between the terms of the . . . poison pill and the welfare of CTS's 
shareholders."125 Specifically, the court required a detailed explana-
tion of the pasis for Smith Barney's opinion that an acquisition of less 
than fifty percent of CTS stock could properly trigger the pill, 126 and a 
complete review of the methodology employed by Smith Barney in 
computing the valuation of the company. 127 The inquiry suggested by 
125. 805 F.2d at 712. 
126. See 805 F.2d at 712-13. Judge Posner demanded evidence explaining how an ownership 
of less than 50% of the company could constitute a blocking position in light of the fact that 
under Indiana law CTS could consummate a merger with the support of a simple majority of the 
shares. He rejected the unexplained conclusions of CTS's investment banker Smith Barney, re-
quiring instead evidentiary justification for setting the rights plan trigger at the particular acqui· 
sition percentage chosen. This skepticism regarding the economic justification for a less-than-
majority-ownership trigger percentage echoes Judge Posner's opinion striking down a prior 
rights plan adopted by CTS. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d at 259 
("If the rationale is to protect minority shareholders, [the rights plan] should be triggered by a 
transaction that creates a majority shareholder or that attempts to squeeze out the minority 
shareholders .••. "), revd. on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
127. See CTS II. 805 F.2d at 713-15. Judge Posner noted that a rights plan that discourages 
tender offers at less than a fixed price is not unlawful if it represents a reasonable, good faith 
effort to sell the company at the highest possible price. But in that regard, 
·[t]he trigger price •.• is highly relevant to the issues of reasonableness and good faith, since 
if set too high it will prevent all tender offers, not just those that are below the corporation's 
sale value. Since the entire premise of the .•• poison pill was that it was designed to facili· 
tate the sale of the company, the pill cannot be upheld if the trigger price is an unreasonably 
high sale price. 
805 F.2d at 714. In this case, Judge Posner was unwilling to say that the district court was 
clearly erroneous in finding that the $50 trigger price in the CTS rights plan represented a rea· 
sonable and good-faith valuation of the company. However, he found "troublesome" the price· 
earnings ratio and the earnings projection utilized by Smith Barney to arrive at a range of value 
for crs. The price-earnings ratio chosen was based on a comparison with other similar manu· 
facturing companies; apparently no account was taken of CTS's peculiar situation as a struggling 
company with a history of exaggerated earnings forecasts that might lead the market to expect a 
lower ratio. 805 F.2d at 714. The $3.23 per share earnings projection used by Smith Barney was 
extravagant in light of the company's recent earnings, was arguably inconsistent with earlier 
estimations by Smith Barney of the likelihood of selling crs at certain prices below $50 per 
share, and was not particularly verified by a second investment banker (although Merrill Lynch 
had "advised the [CTS] board of directors that Smith Barney's methodology in valuing the com· 
pany was sound"). 805 F.2d at 714-15. 
These methodological flaws, in combination with concerns over the trigger percentage in the 
crs rights plan, see note 126 supra, and CTS's history of dogged resistance of Dynamics (exem· 
plified by CTS's first attempt to adopt a poison pill without reasonable deliberation, see CTS I) 
led Judge Posner to suspect that the rights plan was an entrenchment device, notwithstanding the 
district court's finding to the contrary. He therefore remanded for further, more searching exam· 
ination into the reasonableness of the plan's trigger percentage and trigger price. 805 F.2d at 
715-16. 
In addition, Judge Posner expressed cdncern over CTS's method of compensating Smith Dar· 
ney, which might have included (the record was unclear) a bonus upon sale to a white knight. 
805 F.2d at 710-11. But this concern alone would not have warranted remand without the 
court's more substantial doubts regarding the terms of the rights plan. 805 F.2d at 711-12. Also, 
the court was skeptical about the independence of the board's special committee of outside direc· 
tors. But there was ample evidence of reasonable investigation by the special committee, and the 
court determined: 
[W]e are not minded to hold directors to a standard of procedural scrupulousness that 
would transform their role from that of businessmen to that of Article III judges. Further-
more, if directors can be sued both for selling their company too hastily (Van Gorkom), that 
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Judge Posner would probe deeper than the simple procedural review 
of board decisionmaking that characterizes the first prong of the Uno-
cal business judgment rule. It would also go beyond the Unocal rea-
sonableness prong, because under this test Delaware courts have 
upheld similar rights plans - even plans that are triggered at a lower 
percentage of stock acquisition. 128 
To justify greater scrutiny of the economic merits of the CTS pill, 
Judge Posner relied on Revlon. In the board's decision to sell CTS he 
identified the commencement of an auction phase, and held that the 
auction-phase responsibilities imposed on directors by Revlon call for 
stricter judicial review. 129 In contrast, the district court had accepted 
the CTS board's argument that its rights plan was an integral part of a 
strategy to stimulate a competitive auction in fulfillment of the Revlon 
duties. The detailed factfinding demanded by Judge Posner evidently 
required more. Rather than reviewing the directors' conduct in facili-
tating an auction for the maximum benefit of shareholders, Judge Pos-
ner wished to evaluate the substantive merits of the financial analysis 
supporting the CTS rights plan to determine whether the plan ·would 
actually result in shareholder wealth maximization. This difference 
represents a shift in the legal standard away from the business judg-
ment rule as developed by the Unocal and Revlon courts130 and toward 
the duty of loyalty analysis, which is used by courts where there is 
is, at too low a price, and for selling it too slowly (this case), that is, for setting too high a 
price, they are placed on a legal razor's edge. 
805 F.2d at 711. Given the level of detailed scrutiny called for by Judge Posner, it could be 
argued that the court not only was creating a legal razor's edge for corporate directors but was at 
the same time transforming article III judges into businessmen (or, more precisely, investment 
bankers). 
128. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173,180-81 (Del. 
1986) (debt pill like that approved by crs reasonable under Unocal); Moran v. Household Intl., 
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (flip-over poison pill triggered by 20% stock acquisition held 
reasonable under Unocal test); see also CTS I/, 638 F. Supp. at 806-07 (to construct a majority 
acquisition requirement "as an inflexible rule for all rights plans would be inconsistent with 
Delaware law," so that the Seventh Circuit's discussion of a 51 % acquisition trigger appeared to 
the court "illustrative rather than binding"). 
129. See CTS //, 805 F.2d at 716-17; note 116 supra. 
130. Compare the following counter-prophetic remarks from the district court in response to 
the Seventh Circuit's (again Judge Posner's) opinion in CTS L· 
One discernible area in which the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Delaware law po-
tentially differs from mine concerns the degree of inquiry a court should entertain before 
determining that a board of directors has met its burden under Household. ... Mindful that 
the Delaware Supreme Court's cases have in spirit been highly protective of defensive meas-
ures, this court concluded that the directors need only show that their decision was reason-
able. To engraft a "less restrictive alternative" approach from constitutional law onto 
matters of corporate governance seemed to this court inappropriate and inconsistent with 
Delaware law because it would encourage too much judicial second-guessing of business 
decisions. The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. While I see no indication in 
their opinion that they might disagree with me, and doubt that a more "searching" inquiry 
would have changed my result, the issue is at least an open one. 
For these reasons, the court concludes that the Seventh Circuit did not purport to 
change the legal standards. 
CTS II, 638 F. Supp. at 807-08. 
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evidence of entrenchment, unfair dealing, or other bad faith. 131 
There is little or no objective evidence in CTS II from which to 
infer that the board acted for the purpose of entrenchment. Yet Judge 
Posner was highly skeptical of any other explanation for the board's 
actions. He suspected that the CTS directors breached their duty of 
loyalty by approving a bar against all acquisition bids that did not 
meet with their approval, that is, all bids that did not ensure their 
retention of control over the company.132 On the basis of this suspi-
cion alone, and on the theory that the legal standard of review may 
significantly change in the auction phase of a takeover contest, Judge 
Posner would apply the duty of loyalty analysis. 
II. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY ANALYSIS 
To some extent, the interests of management always conflict with 
the interests of shareholders.133 That managers have great discretion 
to take risks with investors' capital goes to the heart of the theory of 
the corporate firm and provides a basis for business judgment rule pro-
tection of board decisionmaking.134 But where particular directors are 
shown to have a private :financial interest in a corporate transaction, 
the business judgment rule will not shield them or the transaction. 135 
Instead, a shareholder can void a transaction where a director has a 
conflict of interest unless, as provided by safe-harbor statutes, the in-
terested director disclosed the conflict before the transaction was ap-
proved or the court finds that the transaction was actually fair to the 
corporation when approved.136 In the takeover context, managers 
face the imminent prospect of losing their jobs, and this fact exacer-
bates the natural conflict within the corporation between the managers 
131. See Part II infra. 
132. See CTS ll BOS F.2d at 715. 
133. See Coffee, supra note 41, at 16-24; Williamson, supra note 41, at 1198-200; cf. A. 
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). 
134. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report of Committee on 
Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporations Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 504 (1975) 
("A director attempting to create profits for his corporation will frequently make decisions in-
volving risk for the enterprise. No personal liability should be imposed upon him in the event his 
good faith decision, in the exercise of business judgment, later seems to have been erroneous."). 
135. Courts make no business judgment presumptions in favor of directors who "appear on 
both sides of a transaction [or] expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense 
of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders 
generally." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Sinclair Oil Corp v. Le-
vien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 
(1964); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (1952); 
Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971); 
136. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983); REVISED MODEL BUSlNESS CORP. Ac:r 
§ 8.31 (1984). For an attempt at a standard codification of directors' obligations with respect to 
conflict-of-interest transactions, see the American Law lnstitute's Principles of Corporate 
Governance: 
A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction with the corporation (other than 
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and shareholders.137 Courts treat target directors who adopt defensive 
measures for purposes of entrenchment as if they have a pecuniary 
self-interest and require them, under the duty of loyalty analysis, to 
show the fairness in fact of the transactions approved.138 This fairness 
standard applies when target directors cannot satisfy either the duty of 
care or reasonableness requirements under the Unocal test, 139 or where 
those challenging the defensive transaction can show director bad 
faith. It will also apply where directors fail to act in accordance with 
their Revlon auction-phase responsibilities. 140 
The duty of loyalty analysis stands in sharp contrast to the defer-
ential review of the business judgment rule. It entails an inquiry into 
"all relevant factors" bearing on the actual, objective fairness of a 
transaction. 141 In evaluating the fairness of defensive measures, courts 
do not look to the subjective motivations behind management's actions 
but only to the actions themselves, 142 asking, for example, whether a 
board's valuation of the company in connection with a white-knight 
merger or for purposes of fixing the exercise price in a poison pill fairly 
represents the company's value in light of all relevant economic and 
financial considerations.143 Such an exhaustive inquiry often allows 
the court to second-guess complex business decisions and requires an 
a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills his duty of loyalty to the cor-
poration with respect to the transaction if: 
(1) disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is made to the 
corporate decisionmaker who authorizes or ratifies the transaction; and 
(2)(A) the transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; or 
(B) the transaction is authorized, following such disclosure, by disinterested direc-
tors, and could reasonably be believed to be fair to the corporation at the time of such 
authorization; or 
(C) the transaction is authorized or ratified, following such disclosure, by disinter-
ested shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets at the time. of the 
shareholder action. 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02(a) 
(rent. Draft No. 5, 1986) (cross-references omitted). 
137. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics 
in Te11der Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 825 (1981); see also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS 
Corp. (CTS I), 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); 
Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
138. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Where a conflict of interest exists in the takeover context, directors must prove the fairness of 
their transactions under the statutory standards, since authorization by "disinterested" directors 
is not possible where all the directors stand to lose their jobs, and the extreme time constraints 
created by the takeover process make ratification by disinterested shareholders impracticable. 
See Siegel, supra note 51, at 395. 
139. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 
1986); Comment, supra note 13, at 557-58. 
140. See Comment, supra note 13, at 558-59. 
141. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE, supra note 20, at 49-55. 
142. See AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 115. 
143. Cf. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711-15 (detailing factors involved in determining fair deal-
ing and appraising fair price in the context of a parent-subsidiary cashout merger). 
302 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:276 
extensive evidentiary hearing, perhaps even including expert testimony 
by market analysts. It is thus easy to see why courts generally grant a 
preliminary injunction of a target's defenses where the business judg-
ment rule is held inapplicable and the standard of review is the duty of 
loyalty analysis. 144 For most takeover battles that end up in court, the 
choice of judicial standard of review is outcome determinative.145 
A. Manifest Conflicts of Interest 
In judicial review of takeover defensive tactics, there is a useful 
distinction between situations where a conflict of interest is manifest 
and those where a conflict is merely suspected. A manifest conflict of 
interest exists where there is sufficient objective evidence from which a 
court can infer entrenchment or other self-interest on the part of a 
target board or where the board cannot make the prima facie showings 
required by Unocal and Revlon. 
Certain defensive transactions are so obviously "a brazen at-
tempt" 146 at entrenchment that courts will deny business judgment 
rule protection without further inquiry into director good faith. Nor-
lin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 147 provides such an example. Norlin 
involved a white squire arrangement148 by which the board of direc-
tors of Norlin transferred huge blocks of authorized but unissued vot-
ing stock to a foreign subsidiary and to a newly created employee 
144. In a rapid-fire battle for corporate control, a disgruntled shareholder group (most often 
the prospective hostile acquirer) is usually quick to challenge target defensive tactics in court, 
seeking a preliminary injunction on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty. The court's decision 
as to whether to enjoin the target's defenses is made on the basis of an evidentiary hearing follow-
ing a short, frantic period of expedited discovery. See, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. 
Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1242, 1246 (Del. Ch. 1985), ajfd., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Uno-
cal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 & n.5 (Del. 1985); see also Wachtell, Special 
Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1433 (1977) ("You are essentially com-
pressing into a span of four, five or six days what would normally be months and months, if not 
years, of typical big case litigation .... "). To win a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must 
show a reasonable probability of success on the merits and irreparable harm if no injunction is 
issued, and must also show that their harm will outweigh the harm to the defendant if the injunc-
tive relief is granted. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 
1987). 
145. See AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 111: "Because the effect of the proper invocation of 
the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the 
determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the 
outcome of derivative litigation." The preliminary injunction hearing is a critical juncture for 
target management because an injunction of the target's defenses usually tolls a swift and adverse 
end to the control contest. See Lipton, supra note 38, at 118 ("The target of an unsolicited tender 
offer must successfully litigate or be faced with afait accompli . ... "). 
146. Wander & LeCoque, supra note I, at 51. 
147. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984). 
148. A white squire is an entity friendly to incumbent management but not interested in, or 
capable of, acquiring the company as a white knight. The white squire may be, among other 
things, an outside group or company, a subsidiary of the target, or the target's employee pension 
fund. Typically, a large amount of stock is issued to the white squire to ensure that control over 
the stock remains in friendly hands. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 1, at 51; THE BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, at 91-93, 187-90. 
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stock ownership plan ("ESOP") controlled directly by the board. 149 
As a result of these transactions, the board arrogated to itself control 
over forty-nine percent of Norlin's outstanding stock.150 The Second 
Circuit held that the evidence "was more than adequate to constitute a 
prima facie showing of self-interest on the board's part,"151 and that 
the white-squire arrangement constituted "a wholesale wresting of 
corporate power from the hands of the shareholders."152 The circum-
stances surrounding creation of the ESOP made plain that it was noth-
ing more than "a tool of management self-perpetuation."153 This 
demonstration of self-dealing was sufficient to persuade the court to 
resort to the duty of loyalty analysis. 154 By virtue of this manifest 
breach of the duty of loyalty, the court quickly concluded that a pre-
liminary injunction was appropriate to prevent Norlin's directors from 
voting the stock in their control.155 Along with Norlin, some poison 
pill cases involve situations where courts have reacted with hostility 
when target management has overtly manipulated corporate structure 
by, for example, creating disproportionate voting rights within a single 
class of shareholders, 156 restricting the transferability of voting 
149. 744 F.2d at 259. 
150. 744 F.2d at 259. 
151. 744 F.2d at 265. 
152. 744 F.2d at 267. Cf. Podesta v. Calumet Indus., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 1[ 96,433, at 93,560 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 1978) ("use of the issuance of shares to accom-
plish an improper purpose, such as to enable a particular person or group to maintain or obtain 
voting control, against the objection of shareholders from whom control is thereby wrested," 
constitutes breach of fiduciary duty) (quoting Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 
309, 313 (1941)). 
153. 744 F.2d at 266. The court explained: 
[The ESOP] was created a mere five days after the district court refused to enjoin further 
stock purchases by Piezo, and at a time when Norlin's officers were clearly casting about for 
strategies to deter a challenge to their control. No real consideration was received from the 
ESOP for the shares. The three trustees appointed to oversee the ESOP were all members of 
Norlin's board, and voting control of all of the ESOP shares was retained by the directors. 
We therefore conclude that the record supports the finding that the transfer of stock to the 
ESOP was part of a management entrenchment effort. 
744 F.2d at 266-67 (footnotes omitted); cf. Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 
231-32 (S.D. Ohio 1987), ajfd., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987)(ESOP enjoined as entrenchment 
device where no showing of benefit to shareholders). · 
154. "Once self-dealing or bad faith is demonstrated, the duty of loyalty supersedes the duty 
of care, and the burden shifts to the directors to 'prove that the transaction was fair and reason-
able to the corporation.' " 744 F.2d at 265 (quoting Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 
382 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
155. See 144 F.2d at 269. Delaware has similarly enjoined use of an ESOP to dilute the 
voting power of a hostile majority shareholder. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d"401, 
408 (Del. 1985) (primary purpose of the funding of the ESOP was ~ntrenchment and this "im-
proper motive overrides the ordinary protection of the business judgment rule"). Not all courts 
have denied business judgment rule protection for boards that have engaged in defensive manipu-
lation of ESOPs. See Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 633 F. Supp. 1066, 1070-
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (upholding ESOP manipulation where it occurred several months before 
takeover initiation). 
156. See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 
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rights, 157 or effecting a discriminatory dilution of shareholders' 
equity.15s 
Some takeover cases involving substantial evidence of entrench-
ment (like Norlin) or gross manipulation of corporate structure may 
also be classified as violations of the reasonableness prong of the Uno-
cal test. Director approval of an unreasonably harmful takeover de-
fense can be sufficient to establish a manifest conflict of interest. In 
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 for example, the 
Delaware chancery court enjoined a defensive, partial self-tender offer 
by Anderson, Clayton, which the evidence indicated was coercive.160 
The self-tender offer was held unreasonable in relation to the "threat" 
presented by an all-cash tender offer made by an acquiring group at a 
price that Anderson, Clayton's own advisers considered fair. 161 Be-
cause of the coercive nature of the self-tender offer, Anderson, Clay-
ton's directors failed to convince the court that the offer would have 
the effect of preserving an option for shareholders who might wish to 
retain an equity interest in the company (in fact, the transaction would 
destroy shareholders' ability to choose). 162 The court found that the 
self-tender offer would have an "obvious entrenchment ejfect"163 and, 
objectively viewed, its adoption constituted a breach of the duty of 
loyalty.164 This conflict of interest existed even though the board was 
able to articulate a bona fide corporate purpose for the transaction in 
satisfaction of Unocal's threshold, duty of care inquiry.165 
In the response phase of a control contest, the target board's wide 
discretion to thwart a takeover and preserve corporate independence 
complicates the identification of a manifest conflict of interest. As il-
lustrated in AC Acquisitions, a balancing of harms under the second 
prong of Unocal effectively counteracts this problem. By contrast, in a 
1985) ("such major changes in structure and voting rights may only be approved by 
shareholders"). 
157. See, e.g., Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 410 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Under Delaware law, a change in corporate structure of this magnitude, re-
ducing the transferability of a shareholder's ability to vote and the value of his or her asset to this 
degree, requires stockholder approval .... "). But see City Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Mann, No. 84-4010, slip op. (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 1985), a.ffd., 782 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1986). 
158. See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-39 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (approval offiip-in poison pill, "subject[ing] an acquiring person's equity to discriminatory 
dilution" and effectively leaving "no tender offer possible by anyone within the next ten years," 
was an ultra vires act). 
159. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
160. No rational shareholder could afford not to tender into the offer since the value of the 
Anderson, Clayton stock was certain to drop materially after consummation of the transaction, 
producing a substantial loss for holders of the remaining shares. 519 A.2d at 113-14. 
161. See 519 A.2d at 110. · 
162. 519 A.2d at 113-14. 
163. 519 A.2d at 114 (emphasis in original). 
164. 519 A.2d at 114-15. 
165. See 519 A.2d at 112; Comment, supra note 13, at 557 n.139. 
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corporate auction, where the more narrowly focused auction-phase 
duty of loyalty test closely circumscribes acceptable director conduct, 
detecting a conflict of interest should be simpler. A manifest conflict 
of interest was established in Revlon, for example, by evidence that the 
following factors were present. During the corporate auction, Rev-
lon's directors negotiated openly with Forstmann while stonewalling 
Pantry Pride. Their eventual lock-up agreement with Forstmann pre-
empted an active bidding contest in return for a promise to protect 
irate noteholders who had threatened to sue the directors.166 The di-
rectors clearly violated the auction-phase duty of loyalty and conse-
quently lost the good favor of the business judgment rule. 167 
Similarly, in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 168 
SCM's board ended a highly competitive auction by granting a lock-up 
option to a favored bidder - in this case, a leveraged buyout consor-
tium in which management had a substantial equity interest.169 Han-
son Trust was effectively foreclosed from further bidding.170 
Although the Second Circuit enjoined the lock-up as a breach of the 
duty of care, the court was chiefly concerned with the directors' appar-
ent lack ofloyalty.171 The court held that independent directors must 
166. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text. 
167. An even clearer example of an auction·phase conflict of interest is Edelman v. Fruehauf 
Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986). There, the directors of Fruehauf shut down a competitive 
auction by prematurely accepting a management leveraged buyout (LBO) proposal. The board 
had voted to finance the management LBO with corporate funds and to approve a no-shop agree-
ment restricting the company's ability to negotiate a better deal elsewhere. In flagrant disregard 
of their auctioneering responsibilities, the directors refused to deal with the hostile bidder Asher 
Edelman, rejecting without deliberation an offer from Edelman to acquire Fruehauf at a higher 
price than management offered. 798 F.2d at 885. 
168. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). 
169. The bidding opened with Hanson making a $60 per share cash tender offer, which 
was followed by a leveraged buyout offer by SCM's management and Merrill Lynch at $70 
per share (85 percent cash, 15 percent debt securities). Hanson answered with a $72 cash 
bid, and the SCM management-Merrill group raised its bid to $74 per share (80 percent 
cash, 20 percent debt securities). In return for this $74 bid, SCM's board granted Merrill a 
lock-up option ..•• 
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 20, at 103-04. SCM management held a 15% 
equity interest in the LBO. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277. 
170. See 781 F.2d at 282-83. Under the agreement approved by the board, an acquisition of 
one third of SCM would trigger the lock-up option, 781 F.2d at 266-67, giving the LBO group 
the irrevocable right to purchase two of SCM's most important assets at a price "conceivably 
well below fair value," 781 F.2d at 282. See 781 F.2d at 279-80 & n.10; THE BUSINESS JUDG-
MENT RULE, supra note 20, at 39 n.73 (the option price was at least $80 million and perhaps as 
much as $230 million below fair value). The court also found that the LBO offer approved by the 
board was coercive to shareholders. See 781 F.2d at 282. 
171. The court held that the business judgment rule did not protect the transaction because 
the SCM directors had breached their duty of care in "hastily" approving the LBO, 781 F.2d at 
277, without an informed judgment as to the fair value of the optioned assets, 781 F.2d at 275. 
But there was significant evidence that the directors actually did exercise due care. See 781 F.2d 
at 287-91 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Evidently, the court found that it could not reach the merits of 
the board's actions based on a breach of the duty ofloyalty since the directors who approved the 
LBO were not members of management and did not have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. 
See Comment, supra note 13, at 551 ("the court labelled the fiduciary breach as one of the duty 
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protect shareholder interests where self-interested management pro-
poses a defensive LB0. 172 By rubber stamping management's propo-
sal (without seeking a higher offer from Hanson173), the directors 
"failed to ensure that alternative bids were negotiated or scrutinized 
by those whose only loyalty was to the shareholders,"174 and the direc-
tors "knew or should have known" that their approval of the lock-up 
would end the bidding.175 The "inescapable conclusion" of the court 
was that the board ruined a competitive auction in order to keep man-
agement's LBO "in the picture at all costs."176 Under the Revlon test, 
this conduct is a breach of the auction-phase duty of loyalty and 
presents a manifest conflict of interest.177 
Approval of a lock-up in the auction phase will not always consti-
tute a breach of the duty of loyalty. The Second Circuit distinguished 
SCM's defensive asset lock-up from lock-up agreements that can serve 
to stimulate an auction by coaxing an otherwise reluctant bidder into 
the bidding contest.178 The Revlon court drew the same distinction.179 
The target boards in Hanson Trust and Revlon used lock-up options 
(on prime corporate assets) as devices to shutdown active auctions that 
threatened management's retention of control.180 But other kinds of 
lock-ups, as both courts acknowledge, can benefit shareholders by cre-
ating incentives for prospective acquirers - incentives that are not 
of care, apparently because the only issue was the propriety of a decision made by directors who 
did not stand to gain financially from the leveraged buyout"). 
172. 781 F.2d at 277. 
173. 781 F.2d at 271. 
174. 781 F.2d at 277. 
175. 781 F.2d at 277 (quoting Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp. 848, 855 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), revd., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
176. 781 F.2d at 283 (quoting MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 
1239, 1249 (Del. Ch. 1985), ajfd., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)). 
177. Hanson Trost was decided before the Delaware Supreme Court handed down its opin-
ion in Revlon (which relied significantly on Hanson, see 506 A.2d at 183-84). Had the Hanson 
Trost court had the benefit of the Revlon analysis, it might have held that SCM's directors 
breached the duty of loyalty by shirking their auction-phase responsibilities. 
178. Hanson Trost, 781 F.2d at 274; see also Note, Lock-Up Options: Towards a State Law 
Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1078-81 (1983) (arguing that "lock-ups designed to stimulate 
bidding" should be encouraged and those "that tend to foreclose all bidders but the optionee" 
should be discouraged). Lock-ups may attract hesitant bidders and stimulate a more aggressive 
auction: 
[A) prospective white knight faces unavoidable expenses, substantial risk, and uncertain 
prospects for a profitable return on its investment of corporate resources. A lock-up option 
gives the white knight a running start - which enhances its probability of ultimate success 
- and simultaneously serves as insurance against failure. When a white knight is drawn 
into a fight it would otherwise have avoided, the target's shareholders are the primary 
beneficiaries. 
Id. at 1078 {footnotes omitted). 
179. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183. 
180. Cf Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 1981) (asset lock-up 
which deters competitive bidding and sets an "artificial ceiling on the value ..• shareholders can 
receive for their shares" may be manipulative under§ 14(e) of Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) 
(1982)). For a critical appraisal of this opinion, see Note, supra note 178, at 1069-74. 
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unfair to existing bidders181 and that demonstrate the board's interest 
in facilitating the auction market for the greatest shareholder gain 
rather than defeating an unfriendly bidder at all costs.182 Logically, 
this justification can apply to other devices, like rights plans, which 
have defensive uses, but which also may be employed by a board for 
the purpose of generating a competitive auction market that wiH 
achieve a higher price for shareholders. A rights plan can interrupt 
temporarily a raider's strategy to acquire the target by tender offer, 
thus giving management an opportunity to attract other prospective 
bidders. 183 This use of a rights plan is not unfair dealing under Revlon 
because it does not foreclose the raider from participating in the result-
ing auction. Hanson Trust and Revlon proscribe (deny business judg-
ment rule protection for) auction-ending devices because approval of 
measures that cut off competitive bidding is a breach of the duty of 
loyalty. But where use of similar devices is auction-generating, the 
duty of loyalty may be served and no manifest conflict of interest is 
established. 
B. Suspected Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule 
Where objective evidence is insufficient to create a manifest conflict 
of interest, there remains in all control contests the suspicion of a con-
flict of interest. Often circumstances spotlight the suspected conflict of 
interest. In CTS II, for example, there was obvious hostility between 
target management and the potential acquirer, Dynamics Corp., and 
the directors of CTS authorized a search for more friendly bidders 
who might have offered management the possibility of retaining con-
trol.184 Also, the compensation scheme for CTS's financial adviser, 
Smith Barney, cast doubt on the directors' motivations.185 In the re-
sponse phase of a takeover battle, target board actions that evidence 
no more than a suspected conflict of interest are reviewed under the 
Unocal test. That test was designed specifically for the purpose of re-
viewing the activities of a board that is suspected of a conflict of inter-
181. A lock-up agreement may be fair to competing bidders where, for example, in an asset 
lockup, no option is granted on the target's crown jewels or, in a stock lockup, the option price is 
equal to the white knight's tender offer price. Note, supra note 178, at 1080. 
182. See Samjens Partners Iv. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 
Yanow v. Scientific Leasing Inc., [0Jrrent] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 93,660 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 
1988). 
183. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 68~ F. Supp. 422, 437-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
184. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp. (CTS 11), 635 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (N.D.Ill.), 
supplemented on rehg., 638 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill), ajfd. in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 
805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). 
185. See note 127 supra. Judge Posner could perhaps have based his decision to remand in 
CTS II solely on the possibility of unreasonable bias in Smith Barney's compensation scheme. 
He chose instead to second-guess the substantive terms of the CTS rights plan, and used a cumu-
lation of unanswered questions, including questions about Smith Barney's compensation, to ra-
tionalize a broader, more substantive scrutiny. 
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est.186 Under the Revlon test, board actions in cases involving only a 
suspected conflict of interest remain eligible for business judgment rule 
protection during the auction phase, since the business judgment rule 
is the only means available under state law to protect the discretion 
needed for target directors to satisfy fully their responsibilities as de-
fined by the Revlon court.187 Moreover, in a corporate auction the 
directors have committed themselves to selling the company. Sale of 
control necessarily involves the possibility that the current managers 
will lose their jobs, and this reality should mitigate a suspected motive 
of entrenchment.188 
CTS II did not involve an auction-phase manifest conflict of inter-
est because the CTS board, unlike SCM's and Revlon's directors, did 
not shut down or dampen a lively auction and did not treat competing 
bidders unequally. Only one bidder was offering to purchase CTS 
stock.189 The CTS directors, reacting to the possibility that Dynamics 
would obtain a blocking position and use that position to thwart a 
future sale, adopted a rights plan in order to preserve their ability to 
negotiate a competitive auction. Like the beneficial lock-up agree-
ments discussed approvingly in Hanson Trust and Revlon, the CTS pill 
was designed as part of a strategy to generate, not preempt, a wealth-
maximizing auction by allowing management the opportunity to at-
tract another bidder (perhaps with a beneficial lock-up). The pill was 
not a takeover defense erected for the purpose of protecting corporate 
independence, since, as Judge Posner recognized, the board had com-
mitted itself to a sale of the target and failure to negotiate a favorable 
sale would have caused shareholder revolt. 190 The board had deter-
mined that a favorable sale of the company would best be achieved by 
auction and that an auction might not be possible if Dynamics ac-
quired a larger stake.191 Whether or not that determination was cor-
rect, approval of the rights plan did not destroy or interrupt an 
existing auction, and did preserve the possibility of a future competi-
tive auction. Indeed, the plan may have made an auction more likely, 
depending on management's ability to attract other offers. 
In approving the rights plan, the CTS board also did not engage in 
unfair dealing as proscribed by Revlon. Revlon imposes on directors 
186. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); text ac-
companying notes 37-46 supra. Under the analysis in Part II.A supra, a target board whose 
actions fail the Unocal test (by not evidencing due care or reasonableness) thereby reveals a 
manifest conflict of interest, and its actions will of course be subject to the duty of loyalty 
analysis. 
187. See Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., Civ. No. 8486, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 16, 1986), 
reprinted in, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 282 (1987); notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text. 
188. See CTS fl 635 F. Supp. at 1181. 
189. The lone bidder, Dynamics Corp., had not even expressed an interest in acquiring CTS. 
See note 118 supra. 
190. See CTS ll 805 F.2d at 715; note 116 supra. 
191. See note 119 supra and accompanying text. 
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the auction-phase responsibility of fair dealing with. bidders where 
(1) the directors decide to dissolve.the company and sell off its assets 
piecemeal, or (2) comparable offers are made by two or more bidders 
(that is, where a competitive auction has begun). 192 A fair-dealing re-
quirement is a sensible protection for shareholder wealth interests in 
these situations. Where the company's assets are sold piecemeal, al-
lowing all interested buyers an equal chance to negotiate with the 
board and gain access to corporate information may help ensure an 
orderly sale at fair value of all assets. And where an auction has be-
gun, treating competing bidders equally will help maximize the final 
sale price attained. In CTS IL the board had decided to sell the com-
pany as a whole, not piecemeal, and had received no bids besides the 
tender offer from Dynamics. Revlon does not suggest that target di-
rectors have an affirmative obligation to negotiate with a single bidder 
or to allow that bidder access to corporate information. The Revlon 
test requires only that treatment of one prospective acquirer be fair in 
relation to other prospective acquirers. Were CTS management suc-
cessful in attracting another offeror, the board would have an obliga-
tion to deal fairly with Dynamics relative to the second bidder. The 
rights plan did not exclude Dynamics from participating equally in 
any auction that might result; the plan merely prevented Dynamics 
temporarily from engaging in further tender offers for CTS at less than 
the exercise price fixed by the board. 
Of course, the CTS board's actions would be subject to further ju-
dicial review under Revlon if the board made no effort to generate al-
ternative competitive bids after putting its rights plan in place. In 
light of their obligation to facilitate an auction of the company, the 
directors could not use their pill to prevent a change of control.193 
The use of the pill would have to be reasonably related to the facilita-
tion of an auction. The district court in CTS II concluded that the 
CTS rights plan could be used to facilitate an auction and that the plan 
was therefore reasonable. But by questioning the substance of the fi-
nancial advice upon which the CTS special committee based its deci-
sion to approve the rights plan, the Seventh Circuit left the board no 
opportunity to carry out its strategy for selling the company. Judge 
Posner's review suggests that the CTS rights plan could not be reason-
192. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184; note 80 supra. 
193. Not only would it cause a revolt among shareholders, it would violate the reasonable-
ness prong of Unocal to employ a poison pill to thwart permanently all unwanted tender offers. 
See note 67 supra and accompanying text. Yet while many poison pills make a nonnegotiated 
takeover highly unattractive, just as many pass muster under the Unocal test. See note 128 
supra. Under the Revlon auction-phase analysis, however, it seems plain that directors who have 
obtained negotiating strength with a poison pill would have to direct their negotiating efforts 
toward a reasonably imminent sale of the company. Perhaps that is one reason why some courts 
are eager to find that an auction phase has commenced. See Wander & LeCoque, supra note 1, at 
53 ("courts are increasingly forcing boards into the role of an auctioneer"). 
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able unless it was supported by sound financial analysis - a standard 
of review that cannot be derived from Revlon. 
III. AN AUCTION-PHASE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
Delaware has announced a strong preference for the facilitation of 
corporate auctions. Lively auctions make it possible for competitive 
market forces to drive up acquisition prices for the maximization of 
shareholder wealth. 194 Where sale of the target is recognized as inevi-
table, Revlon imposes on the board of directors special auctioneering 
responsibilities while preserving an active role for the board in facili-
tating the auction. But as CTS II demonstrates, Revlon does not artic-
ulate a standard of review that both complements directors' auction-
phase responsibilities and protects their discretion to negotiate and 
conduct competitive bidding. The CTS II court recognized that the 
Unocal test for business judgment rule protection is not suited to this 
function since it measures the target board's actions by the threat 
posed by the takeover. In an auction setting, a takeover is the goal, 
not a threat. Thus lacking precise guidance from the Delaware courts 
as to the proper standard by which to review the auction-phase actions 
of a target board, Judge Posner imposed a standard of review akin to 
the duty of loyalty analysis - a standard that allowed him to question 
the economic merits of the CTS rights plan in relation to the goal of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. The duty of loyalty analysis, how-
ever, effectively takes away from target directors the discretion to fa-
cilitate an auction in accordance with Delaware law because it looks 
through director conduct to the substance of a decision, thereby elimi-
nating any vestige of the business judgment rule. A better standard for 
reviewing an auction-phase control transaction (where the transaction 
on its face does not present a manifest conflict of interest) would in-
volve a test for business judgment rule protection that is modified to 
encourage good faith auctioneering conduct. This Part proposes such 
a test. 
The auction-phase standard of review could be structured into a 
two-part analysis similar to the Unocal test. Like the first prong of 
Unocal, the first part of the auction-phase test would screen the moti-
vations behind the target board's actions through an objective, duty-
of-care inquiry into the board's decisionmaking process. The second 
part would review the board's conduct according to the Revlon guide-
lines, gauging the reasonableness of the board's actions in relation to 
the goals of generating, stimulating, or facilitating a lively auction. 
The directors would retain the burden of proof in each inquiry since 
the danger of entrenchment is not lessened in an auction setting - it 
194. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184; Bebchuk, Tender Offers, supra note 18. 
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is, if anything, compounded (as Hanson Trust and Revlon 
acknowledge). 
The threshold inquiry of the suggested test would determine 
whether the board has reason to believe a particular offer is inadequate 
compared to the sale price that may be obtained through a competitive 
auction of the company as a whole, or through a dissolution and piece-
meal sale of its assets. The directors would have to show that they 
have fully examined the adequacy of the offer with the input of impar-
tial financial advisers. 195 In evaluating the adequacy of the offer, the 
board may not give consideration to the potential harmful effects of 
the prospective takeover on any members of the corporate community 
if such consideration may tend to hamper short-term shareholder gain. 
If the board concludes that an offer is inadequate, it may begin an 
investigation into possible means for negotiating a higher offer or stim-
ulating a higher alternative bid - again, closely assisted and sup-
ported by an independent investment adviser. The directors would 
have to show that when they acted to resist the offer they had grounds 
for concluding that a wealth-maximizing auction was a reasonable 
possibility. Where feasible, the court should require that this decision-
making process be turned over to a special committee of the board, 
comprised entirely of outside, independent directors, and that the spe-
cial committee secure in its own behalf independent legal and invest-
ment advice. The special committee would have to present a "paper 
trail" showing that its deliberations were thorough and that reason-
ably prudent consideration was given to all material aspects of the de-
cisions made. 
The second step in the test would require directors to prove that 
they have dealt fairly with all competing bidders and that any meas-
ures taken to resist an auction-phase bid were reasonably designed to 
elicit a higher bid. This examination ensures satisfaction of the direc-
tors' core auctioneering responsibilities. A double-bracketed standard 
of proof may be appropriate here. Where the bidding for the target 
company is not yet competitive, as in CTS II, courts should allow the 
special committee greater discretion to stimulate competition by creat-
ing an auction market. The measures the committee adopts should 
receive business judgment rule protection if at the time adopted they 
were reasonably related to the goal of ultimate shareholder gain.196 Of 
195. To ensure the impartiality of the investment adviser, the court may require that the 
board secure the services of an investment banker other than the banker historically retained by 
management or that the board at least solicit a second opinion from another banker. The court 
may also determine that the requirement of impartiality is incompatible with a compensation 
scheme that rewards the adviser with a bonus if the company is ultimately sold to a white knight. 
See note 185 supra; CTS I/, 805 F.2d at 710-11. 
196. The fair-dealing requirement is relevant only where two or more bidders have made 
comparable offers for the target or where the board has decided to break up the company. See 
notes 80 & 192 supra and accompanying text. 
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course, the directors must confine their resistance to a reasonable 
timeframe. They may not act to relieve themselves of all pressure for 
as long as they wish, while management solicits every possible white 
knight or attempts to secure highly contingent financing for its own 
leveraged buyout. 
On the other hand, the directors may receive less deference where 
two or more bidders have made competitive offers for the target. The 
board must scrupulously avoid conferring a significant benefit on one 
bidder to the disadvantage of another. Any transaction approved by 
the board's special committee that affects control during an active auc-
tion should be protected by the business judgment rule only if, at the 
time approved, 197 it was reasonable to expect that the transaction 
would result in appreciable shareholder gain. In an active bidding sit-
uation, transactions like rights plans or lock-ups may impede the auc-
tion process by dampening a bidder's interest in the target. Therefore, 
transactions affecting a lively auction must be of short duration or 
designed to elicit a reasonably quick, beneficial response from one of 
the prospective acquirers. The board may not halt an already active 
auction in the hope of attracting an additional bidder. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This formulation of the business judgment rule test should prove 
useful in judicial review of auction-phase transactions that involve the 
exercise of business discretion in stimulating higher offers and facilitat-
ing competing bids. The policy of judicial deference that underlies the 
business judgment rule remains relevant during the corporate auction, 
and, as Delaware courts have made plain, application of the rule is 
appropriate where directors have satisfied the stricter auction-phase 
fiduciary duties and have dealt fairly with competing bidders. Direc-
tors may employ devices like rights plans and lock-ups (which in the 
response phase are nothing more than defensive) as tools in negotiat-
ing a more beneficial auction. If courts review under the duty of loy-
alty analysis any decision to resist a bidder in this fashion, the 
potential for a wealth-maximizing auction may be lost. By a simple 
test that focuses on objective evidence of director conduct in light of 
the strict guidelines laid down in Revlon, the standard of review sug-
gested in this Note preserves business judgment rule protection for a 
197. Under either standard of proof, the transaction at issue should be judged by its reasona-
bleness at the time approved. In order to preserve in the auction phase the basic policies behind 
the business judgment rule, the court's emphasis should be on the conduct of the board, not the 
results of the board's actions. 
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target board that acts within its discretion to create a competitive auc-
tion market. 
- Steven G. Bradbury 
